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A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
MEDIATORS (2005): CALL FOR REFORM
OMER SHAPIRA*
The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005), which were developed and adopted by leading organizations in the field of mediation, were designed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all
practice contexts, inform mediating parties, and promote public confidence in
mediation as a process for resolving disputes.
The Model Standards have proved to be an influential ethical source for
mediators, mediation scholars, and legislatures. They have inspired many
codes of conduct for mediators in the United States and abroad and influenced
their content. Many commentators and mediators treat them as an authoritative statement on the ethical conduct expected of mediators.
Over the years, commentators have raised concerns about some aspects of
the Model Standards, for example, their failure to adequately guide mediators
in situations of competing values, and the vagueness of their substantive provisions. No work to date has exposed the Model Standards to a systematic and
comprehensive assessment, which is necessary for an evaluation of their adequacy as a coherent statement of the fundamental ethical guidelines for mediators, and for the development of a viable alternative to them. Ten years after
the adoption of the revised Model Standards in 2005, this Article comes to fill
the gap in the literature and open the discussion on the next version of the
Model Standards.
The Article argues that the Model Standards are in need of reform, points
to key issues that should be addressed in reforming them, and calls for a renewed debate over the shape, content, and vision of the Model Standards.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2005) (hereinafter Model
Standards) were designed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all practice contexts, inform mediating parties, and promote
public confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes.1 They were
developed and adopted for the first time in 1994 by three leading organizations
in the field of mediation: the American Arbitration Association, the American
Bar Association’s Section of Dispute Resolution, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR)—now the Association for Conflict Resolution.2 The 1994 version was revised in 2005 and replaced by the current Model
Standards.3
The Model Standards have proved to be an influential ethical source for
mediators, mediation scholars, and legislatures. In both their old and revised
versions, they have inspired many codes of conduct for mediators in the United
* Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Ono Academic College. Parts of this Article have been presented
at the AALS Alternative Dispute Resolution Section’s 9th Annual Works-in-Progress Conference held
in Texas A&M University School of Law in October 23–24, 2015. I would like to thank the participants of that conference for their comments.
1. MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AM.
BAR ASS’N, AND ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 2005) [hereinafter MODEL STANDARDS].
2. Id. at intro., n.1.
3. Id. at intro.
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States and abroad and influenced their content.4 They were, in general, warmly
welcomed by mediation scholars.5 One commentator has recently suggested
that the Model Standards are “the most authoritative mediator ethical code in
the United States.”6 Another commentator observed that “[t]he Standards have
assumed a Talmudic status in a field eager for direction. Like the Bible, Quran,
or other holy texts, the Standards serve as the textual touchstone for virtually
every argument regarding what mediation is or should be.”7
The importance of the Model Standards has been enhanced in a reality in
which mediation is for the most part left unregulated. Thousands of mediators
across the United States and abroad, especially in private settings, are not subject to any applicable ethical code which governs their actions.8 In the absence
of applicable codes, these mediators are likely to turn to the Model Standards,
which stand out as a shining example of an authoritative statement on the conduct expected of mediators.9
Over the years, however, commentators have raised concerns about some
aspects of the revised Model Standards. Michael L. Moffitt, for example, has
drawn attention to their failure to adequately guide mediators in situations of
competing values.10 Similarly, Laura E. Weidner noted that the revised Model
Standards, like the 1994 version, fail to guide mediators on the way to deal with

4. See, e.g., MICHIGAN STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS (MICH. STATE COURT
ADMIN. OFFICE 2013), http://www.courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/
standards/odr/Mediator%20Standards%20of%20Conduct%202.1.13.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V34EV6E4]; ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS (LAW COUNCIL OF AUSTL. 2011), http://www.lawcouncil.asn.au/lawcouncil/images/LCA-PDF/a-z-docs/EthicalGuidelinesforMediators.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5QPG-PMWG] (Australian Ethical Guidelines); A GUIDE FOR FEDERAL EMPLOYEE
MEDIATORS (FED. INTERAGENCY ADR WORKING GRP. STEERING COMM. 2006), http://
www.adr.gov/pdf/final_manual.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2EK4-XUGH]
[hereinafter
FEDERAL
EMPLOYEE MEDIATORS GUIDE]; Andrea C. Yang, Ethics Codes for Mediator Conduct: Necessary but
Still Insufficient, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1239–42 (2009) (discussing state ethics codes which
implemented the MODEL STANDARDS in various forms and degrees).
5. Laura E. Weidner, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 547, 565 (2006); Yang, supra note 4, at 1236 (discussing the positive reception of the MODEL
STANDARDS); Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: ABA, ACR, and
AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPAL. J. L. 195, 195 (2006).
6. Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., Informed Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 705, 709 (2014).
7. MEDIATION ETHICS: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 10 (Ellen Waldman ed., 2011) [hereinafter
MEDIATION ETHICS].
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., id.
10. See, e.g., Michael L. Moffitt, The Wrong Model, Again: Why the Devil is Not in the Details
of the New Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 31, 31–32 (2006).
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imbalance of power situations while observing their obligation to maintain impartiality.11 Andrea C. Yang has noted that most criticism of the Model Standards focuses on the vagueness of their substantive provisions.12 Kimberlee K.
Kovach, for example, criticized their treatment of honesty in mediation;13 Susan
Nauss Exon pointed out the vague nature of the Model Standards’ provisions
relating to mediator impartiality and fairness;14 Michael T. Colatrella, Jr. discussed the Model Standards’ shortcomings regarding informed consent;15 and
Paul Springer evaluated their approach to advertising.16
The critique of the Model Standards has been sporadic, focusing on particular and isolated aspects of them. My research of the literature has found no
work that has exposed the Model Standards to a systematic and comprehensive
assessment,17 which is, in my view, necessary if we are to evaluate their adequacy as a coherent statement of the “fundamental ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all practice contexts,”18 and if we are to develop a viable
alternative to them. Ten years after the adoption of the revised Model Standards, this Article comes to fill this gap in the literature and open the discussion
on the next version of the Model Standards.
This Article argues that the Model Standards are in need of reform, points
to key issues that should be addressed in reforming them, and calls for a renewed debate over the shape, content, and vision of the Model Standards. It
does not offer a comprehensive and detailed proposal for New Model Standards, a task which cannot be accomplished within the limited scope of an article, and which I have undertaken elsewhere.19
Part II discusses seven major conceptual changes that the Model Standards
should undergo. Section A argues that the definition of mediation in the Model

11. Weidner, supra note 5, at 566.
12. Yang, supra note 4, at 1237.
13. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Musing on Idea(l)s in the Ethical Regulation of Mediators: Honesty,
Enforcement, and Education, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 123, 127, 135–37 (2005).
14. Susan Nauss Exon, How Can A Mediator Be Both Impartial and Fair?: Why Ethical Standards of Conduct Create Chaos for Mediators, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 387, 393, 395–406 (2006).
15. Colatrella, supra note 6, at 710–11.
16. Paul Springer, Avoiding the Full Court Press: Amending the ABA Model Standards of Conduct to Better Regulate Mediator Advertising, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 901, 901 (2014).
17. For an appraisal of the 1994 version of the MODEL STANDARDS, see Jamie Henikoff & Michael Moffitt, Remodeling the Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
87, 87 (1997).
18. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
19. See OMER SHAPIRA, A THEORY OF MEDIATORS’ ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS, RATIONALE, AND
APPLICATION (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016).
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Standards is wrong in mixing descriptive and normative features.20 This Article calls for the adoption of a factual definition which states what mediation is,
not what mediation ought to be.
Section B criticizes the Model Standards’ statement of the purposes of mediation. This statement suits problem-solving mediation, but does not fit other
mediation styles.21 This Article argues that the Model Standards should apply
to mediation styles other than problem-solving mediation and should state so
explicitly.
Section C argues that the levels of guidance “shall” and “should,” which
the Model Standards use to guide mediators, are used inconsistently and sometimes in a wrong way.22 Furthermore, this Article draws attention to a third
level of guidance—“may”—which the Model Standards use without proper explanation.
Section D claims that although the Model Standards implicitly recognize
that mediators owe duties beyond their duties toward the parties, they fail to
state so openly and clarify those additional duties.23 As a result, mediators receive a partial and inaccurate picture of their ethical obligations, which undermines their ability to engage in an ethical practice of mediation. This Article
argues that the Model Standards should expressly state that mediators owe duties toward the profession, the public, and courts or referring bodies, as well as
duties toward the parties. It further argues that such a change could have a
significant effect on the way mediators understand their role, exercise discretion, and practice mediation ethically.
Section E focuses on the inadequate guidance offered by the Model Standards on the conduct expected of mediators in the event that particular standards
conflict, and suggests that a clarification is in place.24 Section F argues that the
nine-standard architecture of the Model Standards needs to be revised to include new Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Respect, Professional Integrity,
and Fairness.25 This Article shows that some aspects of the proposed standards
are partially, yet inadequately, covered by the current Standard of Quality of
the Process. It argues, however, that the Standard of Quality of the Process
should be deconstructed, its content broadened, and the Model Standards restructured to include the newly proposed standards.
Section G challenges the common assumption that the Model Standards do
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section II.D.
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Section II.F.
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not hold mediators accountable for mediation outcomes.26 This Article suggests that the Model Standards’ guidance on the process of mediation could be
interpreted as an implied and partial (although far from satisfying) recognition
of mediator accountability for outcomes, illustrating this point with regard to
uninformed and illegal outcomes. This Article calls for amending the Model
Standards to offer a higher degree of accountability for mediation outcomes,
consistent with other codes of conduct for mediators and in line with supportive
comments of mediation experts.
Part III focuses on the content of particular standards, identifying weaknesses in some of them that require attention. Section A argues that the Standard of Self-determination should be revised in order to improve its guidance on
the allocation of decision-making power between the parties and the mediator.27
It further argues that the standard should incorporate party competency as a
component of self-determination, and should attach more weight to informed
consent.
Section B claims that if the Standard of Impartiality is to be taken seriously
as a realistic normative guide for mediator conduct, it needs to be redrafted in
order to properly address explicit bias or prejudice (to be distinguished from
implicit bias), make perceived partiality (or the appearance of partiality) subject
to a test of reasonableness, acknowledge the appearance of partiality as a
ground for declining a case and withdrawal, and provide for legitimate instances of favoritism that address the need for mediators to treat parties differently during a mediation.28
Section C argues that the Standard of Conflicts of Interest offers an incomplete definition of conflicts of interest, which ignores the possibility that the
mediator preferred his own interest over the interests of all parties.29 In addition, it is argued that the rationale for serious conflicts of interest which the
parties cannot legitimize should be clarified and made explicit in the phrasing
of the standard.
Section D maintains that the Standard of Competence does not adequately
define competence, and sends a wrong, subjective message on the level of competence required of mediators, inconsistent with the Reporter’s Notes on competence.30
Section E argues that the grounds for permitted disclosure listed by the
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See infra Section II.G.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section III.B.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Section III.D.
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Standard of Confidentiality should be qualified with a reminder to mediators
that disclosures, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement, must be consistent
with the other standards.31 It further argues that the standard should be amended
to include a reference to a mediator’s responsibility to make certain that parties
understand the extent to which the mediator will maintain the confidentiality of
information that surfaces in mediation.32
Part IV concludes the Article, calling upon the ADR community to start a
process of reforming the Model Standards.33
II. CONCEPTUAL CRITIQUE OF THE MODEL STANDARDS
The greatest weakness of the Model Standards goes unnoticed. The standards were “designed to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines for persons mediating in all practice contexts,”34 but the theory that informs these ethical
guidelines and justifies them is nowhere to be found. What is the Model Standards’ ethical source of authority? Why should we accept the Model Standards
as an authoritative statement of the ethical obligations of mediators? Why
should mediators, who are not members of the three organizations that have
formally adopted the Model Standards, treat them as an authoritative statement
of the ethical obligations of mediators? Why, for example, do the Model Standards consist of nine standards and not sixteen? Why these nine standards and
not others? And how can we be sure that the content of the standards is correct
and accurate?
Neither the Model Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes that accompany them
answer these questions. Without adequate answers, the Model Standards’ authority is undermined, and their structure and content open to a charge of arbitrariness. What the Model Standards lack is a theory that supports and justifies
them. What they fail to provide is a method to identify the ethical obligations
of mediators and ascertain their particular content.
I believe it is possible to construct a theory that justifies a set of ethical
standards that applies to all mediators.35 This, however, is not the focus of this
Article, which is designed to offer a critical reading of the Model Standards,
demonstrate some of their deficiencies, call for reform, and suggest key points
on the road to reform. The following sections undertake that task.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Section III.E.
See infra Section III.E.
See infra Part IV.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl. (emphasis added).
See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3.
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A. An Inadequate Definition of Mediation: Mixing Descriptive and
Normative Features
The Model Standards define mediation as “a process in which an impartial
third party facilitates communication and negotiation and promotes voluntary
decision making by the parties to the dispute.”36 For the most part it is a fine
definition because its wording can capture, in my view, the main types or orientations of mediation, most notably problem-solving mediation (including facilitative and evaluative styles of mediation), transformative mediation, and
narrative mediation.37 These types of mediation,38 despite their differences, exhibit several fundamental features which any mediation process shares: (1) a
third party, (2) who assists parties to a dispute, (3) to communicate and make
voluntary decisions. True, one would be correct to observe that a problemsolver mediator will be more outcome-oriented and use the language and tools
of needs and interests, a transformative mediator more process-oriented, seeking to empower the parties and bring about recognition shifts,39 and a narrative
mediator more fixed on the relationship between the parties, seeking to deconstruct the conflict stories and help the parties to develop an alternative narrative;40 however, whether one is a problem-solver, transformative, or narrative
mediator, the core of one’s practice is helping parties in a dispute to communicate and make voluntary decisions.41 In this sense, therefore, the Model Standards are on the right track.
The difficulty with the Model Standards’ definition of mediation is its description of the third party as impartial, thereby making impartiality a component of the process definition. This is wrong because no one seriously argues
that when a mediator is not impartial the process he is conducting is not in fact
a mediation.42 Impartiality is a normative concept, which the Model Standards
36. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
37. See, e.g., MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 19–24 (treating these styles, in effect, as the
main styles of mediation).
38. See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994) (discussing transformative mediation); Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for Effective Representation in A Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 935, 942 (2001) (discussing problem solving mediation); JOHN
WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, NARRATIVE MEDIATION: A NEW APPROACH TO CONFLICT
RESOLUTION (2000) (discussing narrative mediation).
39. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 89–94; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A SOURCEBOOK
25–26 (Joseph P. Folger et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION].
40. WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 38, at 38, 82.
41. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 18.
42. On the difference between a descriptive definition of mediation that factually describes mediation practice, and a normative definition of mediation that describes what mediation ought to look
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further develop in a Standard of Impartiality.43 According to the norm of impartiality, mediators have a normative obligation to conduct mediations impartially, and if they fail to do so they are conducting the mediation in a normatively wrong way. While the three elements of the definition of mediation
mentioned above are factual and necessary for any mediation process to exist,
impartiality, like other common norms of mediation such as confidentiality and
conflicts of interest, is a normative standard that mediators are expected to follow, and a failure on their part to do so does not strip the process of its mediation
title.44 The definition of mediation in the Model Standards therefore should not
include a reference to the impartiality of the mediator, though impartiality
should continue to be one of the standards applicable to mediators.
B. An Outdated Statement on the Purposes of Mediation: Moving
Beyond Problem-Solving Mediation
The Model Standards accompany the definition of mediation with a statement on the purposes of mediation. It provides that “[m]ediation serves various
purposes, including providing the opportunity for parties to define and clarify
issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests, explore and assess
possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory agreements, when desired.”45 Mediators who belong to the problem-solving school of mediation,
both facilitative and evaluative, will probably feel comfortable with this list of
purposes and its reference to the language of issues, interests, and options.
However, a growing number of mediators who have a transformative or narrative orientation are likely to find it partial and unsatisfactory. Transformative
mediators, for example, will probably want to add the goals of empowering
disputants,46 recognition (helping parties to connect to the other),47 and the
transformation of “conflict interaction from destructive and demonizing to positive and humanizing.”48 And narrative mediators will add to the goals of mediation the deconstruction of the conflict stories of the parties49 and the construction of an alternative story of cooperation that will allow the parties to
cooperate with each other.50
like, see, for example, Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 69, 79–89 (2005) (discussing prescriptive and descriptive definitions of mediation).
43. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.
44. See Moffitt, supra note 42, at 79–89.
45. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
46. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 85; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 25.
47. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 38, at 92; TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 25.
48. TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION, supra note 39, at 26.
49. See WINSLADE & MONK, supra note 38, at 38.
50. See id. at 82.
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The Model Standards do not state that they are intended for the guidance of
problem-solving mediators alone. On the contrary, some comments in the Reporter’s Notes to the Model Standards suggest that they are aimed at other mediation styles as well. Already in 2005, the Reporter’s Notes noted:
Since the publication of the 1994 Version, there has been significant academic and policy discussion focused on mediation
style or theory. In particular, the terms, facilitative and evaluative, to describe mediator orientations have taken on particular meanings in the popular literature and approaches to mediation differently conceptualized in such frameworks as
problem-solving or transformative have been trenchantly analyzed. The revised definition of mediation is not designed to
exclude any mediation style or approach consistent with
Standard I’s commitment to support and respect the parties’
decision-making roles in the process.51
Since the adoption of the revised Model Standards in 2005, the transformative and narrative styles have further developed and gained recognition. For
example, Ellen Waldman’s casebook on mediation ethics discusses these styles
of mediation practice alongside the problem-solving style as representing the
current field of mediation.52 Thus, the purposes of transformative and narrative
mediation should be explicitly recognized in a reformed version of the Model
Standards. Alternatively, the “various purposes of mediation” paragraph
should be dropped, and a general definition of mediation applicable to all styles
of mediation as mentioned earlier retained.
This last point raises, of course, the question whether a single code of conduct can apply simultaneously to different styles of mediation. Some scholars
have suggested that the differences in style require different codes,53 but no one
to date has developed this idea beyond making the argument itself. In fact, to
51. REPORTER’S NOTES (2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/
2011_build/dispute_resolution/mscm_reporternotes.authcheckdam.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/W8LKDFDX] (analyzing the MODEL STANDARDS) (emphasis added).
52. See MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 122–24.
53. See Alison E. Gerencser, Alternative Dispute Resolution Has Morphed into Mediation:
Standards of Conduct Must Be Changed, 50 FLA. L. REV. 843, 846 (1998) (arguing that states should
develop specific standards for discrete types of mediation); see also Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency
and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition? The Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in
Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 258 (1989) (arguing that different conceptions of mediation support
different mediator standards); Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The
Case for Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 284 (2003)
(“On the one hand, mediators need clear ethical rules to guide their behavior. On the other hand, the
mediation profession is radically heterogeneous. The types of mediations, dispute contexts in which
mediation is used, and styles of mediation are many. Simple ethical rules will often not apply comfortably across such contexts.”).
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the best of my knowledge there are no published codes of conduct for mediators
specifically developed and designed for transformative and narrative mediators.
It seems to me that the primary goals of the Model Standards—“to guide the
conduct of mediators; to inform the mediating parties; and to promote public
confidence in mediation as a process for resolving disputes”54—equally apply
in the context of transformative and narrative mediation. I believe that all mediators, irrespective of style, are subject to core ethical standards whose content
may be ascertained, by using role-morality theory and applying it to a core definition of mediators’ role.55 Any mediator, for example, irrespective of style,
must be competent, respect party self-determination, disclose conflicts of interest, and maintain confidentiality. It is time that the mediation community discussed the meaning of these standards from the perspective of each style, incorporated them into newly revised Model Standards, and made it clear to
mediators, mediation parties, and the general public that all mediators, whether
problem-solvers, transformative, or narrative, are guided by the reformed code.
C. Misguided Use of Levels of Guidance: Between Shall, Should, and
May
The Model Standards’ Note on Construction refers to two levels of guidance for mediator conduct:
The use of the term “shall” in a Standard indicates that the
mediator must follow the practice described. The use of the
term “should” indicates that the practice described in the standard is highly desirable, but not required, and is to be departed
from only for very strong reasons and requires careful use of
judgment and discretion.56
However, the use of these terms in the Model Standards is inconsistent and
the reason for preferring one over the other is unclear. For example, the Standard of Impartiality states in section II.B that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner,” but then goes on to provide in subsection II.B.1
that “[a] mediator should not act with partiality or prejudice based on any participant’s personal characteristics, background, values and beliefs, or performance at a mediation, or any other reason.”57 No explanation is given for the
variation in guidance, which in fact seems to be mistaken in light of the Reporter’s Notes comment on that subsection, which reads:

54.
55.
56.
57.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
I develop and defend this argument in SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction.
Id. at Standard II.B & II.B.1 (emphasis added).
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In response to insightful public comment, the Joint Committee revised the language of what is now Standard II (B)(1)
to reflect that the mediator must not act in a manner that favors
or prejudices any mediation participant based on the personal
characteristics, background, values and beliefs, or performance
at a mediation of that individual.58
This inconsistency continues in subsection II.B.2, which provides that “[a]
mediator should neither give nor accept a gift, favor, loan or other item of value
that raises a question as to the mediator’s actual or perceived impartiality.”59
Again, in light of the mandatory requirement in section II.B that the mediator
“shall conduct a mediation in an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives
the appearance of partiality,”60 one would expect the Model Standards to have
prescribed that a mediator shall “neither give nor accept a gift, favor, loan or
other item of value that raises a question as to the mediator’s actual or perceived
impartiality.”61
This inconsistency can be further illustrated by the choice of terms in other
standards as well. The Standard of Confidentiality, for example, states in section V.A that “[a] mediator shall maintain the confidentiality of all information
obtained by the mediator in mediation, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties
or required by applicable law,”62 but then provides in subsection V.A.2 that “[a]
mediator should not communicate to any non-participant information about
how the parties acted in the mediation. A mediator may report, if required,
whether parties appeared at a scheduled mediation and whether or not the parties reached a resolution.”63 One could attempt to explain and justify these different levels of guidance by arguing that “information obtained by the mediator” is not the same as “information about how the parties acted.”64 However,
this does not seem to be the Reporter’s Notes understanding of the matter, the
latter noting that
some public comments suggested that Standard I [Self-determination] should contain guidance to a mediator regarding his
or her duty to report “good faith” participation by various mediation participant . . . . However, in Standard V (A) (2) on
confidentiality, the Joint Committee explicitly supports the po-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 11 (emphasis added).
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.B.2 (emphasis added).
Id. at Standard II.B (emphasis added).
Id. at Standard II.B.2.
Id. at Standard V.A (emphasis added).
Id. at Standard V.A.2 (emphasis added).
Id.
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sition widely adopted in practice and program rules that a mediator can override confidentiality, if required, for only two
purposes: to report whether parties appeared at a scheduled mediation or to report whether the parties reached a resolution;
the Joint Committee rejected overriding the confidentiality requirement for any other purpose.65
It appears, then, that the Model Standards should have provided that a mediator shall not “communicate to any non-participant information about how
the parties acted in the mediation,” subject to the two mentioned exceptions.66
These examples of the confusion between shall and should suggest that such a
distinction is unsupported in the context of the Model Standards and must be
reconsidered, explained, and applied consistently throughout them.
Moreover, the Model Standards confusingly use another term of guidance—“may”—without explaining its meaning in their context. One might
have thought that if “shall” indicates mandatory conduct and “should” indicates
a highly recommended conduct that “can be discarded only for compelling reasons,”67 then “may” indicates unguided, free choice on the part of the mediator,
which requires no justification. However, in effect even permitted actions or
decisions require an exercise of professional discretion based on good and relevant reasons.
For example, the Model Standards provide that “[a] mediator may accept
or give de minimis gifts or incidental items or services that are provided to facilitate a mediation or respect cultural norms so long as such practices do not
raise questions as to a mediator’s actual or perceived impartiality.”68 Despite
the use of the permissive term “may,” then, it seems that the mediator, as in the
case of “should” as guidance, is here in fact provided with “strong guidance”
(to use the language of the Reporter’s Notes69) that requires him to justify his
actions. The point I am making here is that conceptually the use of both “may”
and “should” imposes a burden on the mediator to justify his actions, and the
Model Standards with their emphasis on the meaning of “should” and disregard
of the meaning of “may” send a wrong message to mediators.70 In effect, a

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 10 (emphasis added).
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.2.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.B.3 (emphasis added).
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8.
See MCI PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR MEDIATORS (MEDIATION COUNCIL
OF
ILL.
2009),
http://www.mediationcouncilofillinois.org/sites/default/
files/MCI%20Professional%20Standards%20of%20Practice_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7KJ-N8BX]
(“Use of the term ‘may’ in a Standard is the lowest strength of guidance and indicates a practice that
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mediator may only take an action when that action is consistent with the exercise of his role in accordance with the Model Standards, and this should be
made clear in them.
D. A Missing Statement on the Obligations of Mediators: A Need to
Openly Recognize the Duties toward the Profession, the Public, and
Courts or Referring Bodies
The Model Standards “serve as fundamental ethical guidelines” for mediators,71 indicating what mediators must and should do in the course of practice.72
They lay down various obligations of mediators, such as a duty to conduct mediation on the basis of party self-determination,73 avoid conflicts of interest,74
and act with competence.75 Clearly, these obligations are owed to the mediation
parties. For example, the Model Standards provide that the parties have a right
to exercise self-determination in the course of the mediation,76 to know about a
mediator’s conflict of interest,77 and to be “satisfied with the mediator’s competence and qualifications.”78
However, mediators have responsibilities other than their obligations to the
parties. The Model Standards do not explicitly state that point, but it necessarily follows from some of their provisions. For example, the Standard of Selfdetermination provides that “a mediator may need to balance . . . party selfdetermination with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process in accordance
with these Standards.”79 This means that the Model Standards envisage cases
in which the mediator may act against the wishes of the parties, and unless one
understands their approach as paternalistic, aimed at protecting the parties from
themselves, the conclusion must be that the mediator in such cases is discharging responsibilities to persons or bodies other than the parties.
This point is made clear by the language of the Standard of Conflicts of
Interest, which provides in section III.E that “[i]f a mediator’s conflict of interest might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of the mediation,

the mediator should consider adopting but which can be deviated from in the exercise of good professional judgment.”) (emphasis added) [hereinafter ILLINOIS STANDARDS].
71. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.
72. Id. at Note on Construction.
73. Id. at Standard I.A.
74. Id. at Standard III.A.
75. Id. at Standard IV.A.
76. Id. at Standard I.A.
77. Id. at Standard III.C.
78. Id. at Standard IV.A.1.
79. Id. at Standard I.A.1.
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a mediator shall withdraw from or decline to proceed with the mediation regardless of the expressed desire or agreement of the parties to the contrary.”80
In this section, the Model Standards in effect refer to a duty of mediators to
avoid conduct that “might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity
of the mediation.” This duty is not aimed at protecting the parties’ interests and
is not owed to the parties. Rather, it is designed to protect the process of mediation, reflecting, I would argue, a duty to the profession of mediation and to the
public.
Neither the Model Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes bring these obligations to the forefront, but they are present between the lines. This explains why,
for example, the Reporter’s Notes note that the Standard of Impartiality in section II.C will not allow the mediator to conduct a mediation if he is unable to
conduct it in an impartial manner, even if the parties agree that he may proceed.81 They see the integrity of the process of mediation as an interest of the
profession and the public that is beyond the parties’ control.82 The Reporter’s
Notes come close to making such a statement in their comment on the Standard
of Competence, in which they recognize a mediator responsibility to the public,
noting that “to promote public confidence in the integrity and usefulness of the
process and to protect the members of the public, an individual representing
himself or herself as a mediator must be committed to serving only in those
situations for which he or she possesses the basic competency to assist.”83
The Model Standards include other provisions that are phrased in a manner
indicating that mediators have ethical obligations to protect interests other than
the parties’. The Standard of Quality of the Process, for example, provides in
section VI.A.6 that “[a] mediator shall not conduct a dispute resolution procedure other than mediation but label it mediation in an effort to gain the protection of rules, statutes, or other governing authorities pertaining to mediation.”84
It is clear that the purpose of this provision is not to protect the parties, but the
public.85 The Reporter’s Notes help make this clear, noting that “a mediator
cannot engage in a ruse of labeling a dispute resolution process as ‘mediation’
in order to gain its benefits (such as confidentiality protections) when it is apparent that the participants have designed and participated in some other form
of dispute resolution.”86
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at Standard III.E.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 13.
Id. at 14.
Id. (emphasis added).
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.6.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18.
Id. (emphasis added).
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Similarly, subsection VI.A.9 provides that “[i]f a mediation is being used
to further criminal conduct, a mediator should take appropriate steps including,
if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”87
The Reporter’s Notes refer to this provision, noting that “it guides a mediator
who confronts mediation participants using mediation to further criminal conduct . . . to take appropriate steps to deter them from accomplishing that goal,”88
clearly indicating a duty to the public rather than to the parties.
An explicit recognition of mediator responsibilities other than to the parties
is not rare in codes of conduct for mediators. The Code of Professional Conduct
for Labor Mediators, for example, provides that “[t]hose who engage in the
practice of mediation . . . must be aware that their duties and obligations relate
to the parties . . ., to every other mediator, to the agencies which administer the
practice of mediation, and to the general public.”89 The Australian National
Mediator Accreditation Standards: Practice Standards provide that “[t]he
Practice Standards are intended to govern the relationship of mediators with the
participants in the mediation, their professional colleagues, courts and the general public . . . .”90 The Florida Rules for Certified and Court-Appointed Mediators (hereinafter: Florida Rules) include separate Rules entitled “Mediator’s
Responsibility to the Parties,”91 “Mediator’s Responsibility to the Mediation
Profession,”92 “Mediator’s Responsibility to the Mediation Process,”93 and
“Mediator’s Responsibility to the Courts.”94 And the North Carolina Revised
Standards of Professional Conduct for Mediators provide that “[p]ersons serving as mediators are responsible to the parties, the public, and the courts to conduct themselves in a manner that will merit that confidence.”95
87. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9.
88. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18.
89. CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR LABOR MEDIATORS pmbl. , 29 C.F.R. pt. 1400 app. (2012),
http://ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3410 [https://perma.cc/8TEY-KYKX].
90. NATIONAL MEDIATOR ACCREDITATION STANDARDS: PRACTICE STANDARDS, Application
(MEDIATOR STANDARDS BD. 2012), http://www.msb.org.au/sites/default/files/documents/Practice%20Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TD9-RGRG].
91. RULES FOR CERTIFIED AND COURT-APPOINTED MEDIATORS in ADR RESOURCE
HANDBOOK 95, R. 10.300, at 105 (FLA. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. 2015), http://www.flcourts.org/
core/fileparse.php/550/urlt/RuleBookletJanuary2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/WM28-JJAN ] [hereinafter
FLORIDA RULES].
92. Id. at R. 10.600.
93. Id. at R. 10.400.
94. Id. at R. 10.500.
95. REVISED STANDARDS OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS pmbl., at 1 (N.C. DISPUTE
RESOLUTION COMM’N 2011), http://www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/html/pdf/SOC4_14.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FZ66-D9YR] (adopted by the Supreme Court of North Carolina); see also CAL. R.
CT. R. 3.850(a) (Revised January 1, 2015), www.courts.ca.gov/cms/rules/index.cfm?title=three
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The Model Standards, therefore, should indicate in their Preamble to whom
mediator obligations are owed. They should declare that the standards reflect
mediators’ obligations toward the parties, the profession, the public, and to the
courts or referring agencies when appropriate. This statement will have to be
followed by a reassessment of the language of many of the standards, in order
to ensure that they accurately reflect the multiple obligations of the mediator.
For example, the Standard of Competence, which currently provides that “[a]ny
person may be selected as a mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied
with the mediator’s competence and qualifications,”96 will have to be qualified
by the obligation to the profession and the public to maintain the integrity of
the process.97
I expect these changes to the Model Standards will have far-reaching implications for the way mediators understand their role, exercise discretion, and
practice mediation ethically. I will illustrate this point by considering the commentaries to an ethical scenario set in Ellen Waldman’s book on mediation ethics.98 In a nutshell, the scenario involves Ziba and Ahmed, who are an IranianAmerican Muslim couple, living in the United States and in a process of separation.99 The wife wants a divorce, the husband objects.100 According to Islamic law and unlike in American law, the divorce cannot proceed without the
husband’s consent.101 The wife wants to carry out the divorce according to
Islamic law in order to meet the expectations of the Muslim community which
she belongs to and wants to stay part of.102 The husband takes advantage of that
and puts pressure on the wife to accept unfavorable divorce terms according to
which she will forfeit any right to marriage dissolution payments and any other
financial support for herself, and also give up custody of their children (aged

[https://perma.cc/DL2A-DKH8] (“Mediators in court-connected programs are responsible to the parties, the public, and the courts for conducting themselves in a manner that merits that confidence.”)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA RULES]; TEX. ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR MEDIATORS pmbl. (TEX. SUP. CT.
2011),
http://www.txcourts.gov/All_Archived_Documents/SupremeCourt/AdministrativeOrders/
miscdocket/11/11906200.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ND5-8MJH] (“Mediators should be responsible to the
parties, the courts and the public, and should conduct themselves accordingly.”) [hereinafter TEXAS
GUIDELINES]; ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at Definition § E. (‘‘The mediator’s commitment
shall be to the participants and the process.’’).
96. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard IV.A.1 (emphasis added).
97. See infra Section III.D.
98. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 318.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 319.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 318.
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two and three) at the age of five.103 The wife capitulates and agrees to the husband’s terms.104
Two mediation experts, Professor Harold Abramson and Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, have been asked to comment on that scenario. Interestingly,
they reach opposite conclusions.105 Abramson is willing to mediate the case,
while Menkel-Meadow refuses to do so.106
Abramson’s gravest concern is that the mediator—any Western mediator,
including himself—will be charged with cultural imperialism, that is, that the
mediator will impose Westernized values on the parties and replace the parties’
values with his or her values.107 His approach reflects the great weight mediators traditionally assign to the parties’ wishes and right to self-determination.108
However, I find his decision to help the parties reach an agreement unconvincing.
Abramson’s decision is affected by his view of the role of mediators: “My
limited role as a mediator who perseveres to honor the principle of party selfdetermination becomes clear in this situation. In the end, all mediators can do
is conduct a process where the parties can make an informed choice, regardless
of how personally painful the choice may be to one of the parties and how unfair
the result may seem to the mediator.”109 Abramson is torn between his values
and the parties’ choice, but sees no way out that could justify the mediator’s
withdrawal: “Even in the face of the parties’ consent or apparent consent, the
mediator may still find the agreement so personally abhorrent as to want to
withdraw. But how can a mediator withdraw and avoid the charge of cultural
imperialism?”110
He attempts to do so by resorting to what he refers to as “universal international norms”:
As difficult as this was, I tried to put my own personal values
aside and look instead to see whether working with this couple
would violate universally accepted international principles of
human rights. My inquiries suggest that the answer is no;
norms surrounding gender equity diverge dramatically
throughout the world. This is one of the disturbing facts of
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 319.
Id.
Compare id. at 320–27, with id. at 327–35.
Id.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 333.
Id.
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multiculturalism, and as a mediator, I am wary of using my
own personal views as the yardstick for how the parties should
structure their affairs.111
Thus, according to Abramson, the mediator’s source of ethical guidance in
this Muslim-American couple’s mediation is international law. He scrutinizes
the United Nation Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and finds
that although they declare that men and women have equal rights in marriage
and its dissolution,112 many Middle Eastern Islamic countries have not ratified
the convention and even took explicit exception to gender equality.113 He concludes that his “forays into international law revealed no principled source of
internationally recognized standards that could be the basis for withdrawing
from the mediation.”114
I do not find that argument persuasive. Why should an American mediator,
mediating a case on American soil between two American citizens who are
Muslims, all being subject to American law and members of the American public, be ethically guided by the decision of Middle Eastern countries to reject
international treaties on human rights? I believe that the effort to legitimize the
parties’ choice at all costs is a reflection of a version of mediation ethics that is
over-dominated by party self-determination and ignores the fact that mediators
have other ethical obligations as well.
In fact, Abramson refers in his comment to such obligations, but does not
treat them as such or appreciate their implications. One occasion in which
Abramson abandons the party self-determination version of mediation ethics is
where he states that “[i]f both parties want to continue with me and the mediation, I think I should try to mediate the best agreement the parties are willing to
enter into, so long as the agreement is not illegal.”115 Abramson believes, therefore, that as a mediator he should not facilitate an illegal agreement no matter
what the parties want, recognizing that mediators have responsibilities that go
beyond their duty toward the parties to respect their self-determination.
Describing the hard choice he faces, Abramson makes another observation
that hints at mediator obligations toward nonparties that may conflict with the
parties’ choice:
I would not want the mediation process (or me) to be associated
with such an unfair mediated result. I would want to avoid
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 327.
Id. at 333.
Id.
Id. at 334.
Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
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conferring the imprimatur of mediation on a process and result
that violated such a core value of fairness, even when my definition of fairness was shaped by distinctively Westernized values.116
Abramson captures with these comments the idea that mediation is not
about the relationship between the parties and the mediator alone; a particular
mediation can have an impact on the way other mediation processes and other
mediators are publicly perceived; it can have an effect on public confidence in
the mediation profession and process; and it may influence the willingness of
potential parties to use mediation in the future to resolve differences. These
concerns reflect the relationships of mediators with the profession of mediation
and the public, establishing an ethical obligation of mediators to conduct mediation in a manner that maintains the standing of the profession and process of
mediation and public trust in them.117
Abramson is right to refuse to help the parties reach an illegal agreement.
An illegal agreement is likely to bring mediation into disrepute, harming the
standing of mediation and undermining public trust in the profession and process of mediation, and as a mediator he has ethical duties toward the public and
toward the profession of mediation to prevent the harm to the public and the
profession that would follow from facilitation of an illegal mediated agreement.118 It is, however, difficult to reconcile this responsibility with Abramson’s own legal assessment of the case (which is also shared by the other commentator, Menkel-Meadow):119
Consider the way Ahmed’s power over granting a divorce
was being used to extort a one-sided agreement, at least from
a Westernized point of view. A Western mediator would likely
view as unfair an agreement where unemployed Ziba waives
needed financial support and relinquishes rights to her children
once they turn five. Under Westernized common law and statutory laws, such a one-sided agreement is also likely to be invalid and unenforceable due to Ahmed’s extortionate behavior
and the duress suffered by Ziba who wants the divorce.120
Note that the ethical obligation concerning the standing of the institution of

116. Id.
117. See Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L.
REV. 281, 324–27, 329–34 (2012) [hereinafter Fairness]; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 3 § 3.7.
118. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 339–40; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 8 § 8.2.4.3;
infra Section II.G.2.
119. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 323, 326–27.
120. Id. at 328.
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mediation and mediators is not confined to illegal outcomes. This equally explains why mediators have a duty to prevent an agreement which is not illegal
yet radically departs from social norms to a degree that could jeopardize public
faith in the process and profession of mediation.121 This does not mean that a
mediator may substitute his or her personal notions of fairness and unfairness
for the parties’, because the mediator’s conception of fairness must be grounded
in a public conception of fairness, which reflects a norm or perception which is
external to the mediator.
The public in the scenario is American society. It is neither the Muslim
community in which the parties reside nor the Islamic communities of some
Middle Eastern countries. The mediator in the scenario is conducting a dispute
resolution process in the United States, which he and the parties label “mediation.” As such, this process should be conducted consistent with the norms that
apply to mediation in the United States. The conduct of the mediator will be
evaluated according to these norms and his or her conduct can potentially affect
his or her fellow American mediators and mediation processes all over the
United States. On the facts of the scenario, it seems to me that even if the
proposed terms of the agreement were not illegal they are extreme to a degree
that would lead the general public to perceive the mediation as faulty and to
question the integrity of the mediator.
Turning to the other commentator, Menkel-Meadow, unlike Abramson, is
not afraid of being charged with cultural imperialism. She is convinced and
openly declares that gender equality is right, and explains that it would be
wrong for her to mediate the case.122 If the parties came to see her she would
refer them to a mediator in a specialized religion-based mediation center after
advising them to seek legal advice about what is necessary for a legal divorce
in her community.123
Like Abramson, Menkel-Meadow feels the heavy weight of party self-determination. She notes, for example, that “some mediators might ask who am
I to judge what these parties want; in the interest of self-determination, they
have chosen to be governed by their own religious norms.”124 However, unlike
Abramson, she has no hesitation rejecting the case:
I could not, given my own “ethical culture” . . ., act or be
“complicit” in an agreement that I felt was legally, morally, or
ethically wrong . . . in my view, no mediator (and certainly not
this mediator) should participate in a mediation that she thinks
121.
122.
123.
124.

See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 337–38.
See MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 322.
Id. at 320, 326–27.
Id. at 323.
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will lead to a morally, legally, or ethically “unconscionable”
result. What is unconscionable is, of course, subjective, personal, and nonuniversal.125
Menkel-Meadow’s analysis of the scenario is clearly much more personal
than Abramson’s. In a way, her analysis replaces Abramson’s party self-determination version of mediation ethics with a more personal, subjective version.
In Menkel-Meadow’s words:
For me . . . a mediator is also a party to a mediation, and thus
the agreement that is reached must also be one that I can be
accountable and responsible for as a participant in the process.
My sense of ethics, culture, and yes, even justice is also at
stake, for I am a party too.126
I am concerned that mediators who read this account of mediation ethics
might be tempted to replace the over-dominance of the parties’ wishes in
Abramson’s account of mediation ethics with an over-dominance of the personal values, beliefs, and preferences of the mediator, thereby undermining the
legitimacy and weight of guidelines and standards external to the mediator.
It seems to me that if mediation ethics were to be widely understood as
encompassing the responsibilities of mediators to their profession and the public as well as their duties to the parties and their personal integrity, mediators
would have a sounder basis for making ethical decisions. Moreover, philosophers of morality have consistently argued that morality and ethics are nonsubjective in the sense that the norms of morality and ethics can be rationally
and impartially justified.127 This is the dominant approach in professional ethics thinking. Michael Davis, for example, warned that “[i]ndividual-centered
relativism . . . cuts off ethical discussion as soon as it begins,”128 and Michael
Pritchard commented that “professional ethics is not an ethics for each individual professional simply to conjure up.”129
The alternative to both party-centered mediation ethics and mediator-cen-

125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 326.
127. See, e.g., BERNARD GERT, COMMON MORALITY 17 (2004) (“[G]iven agreement on the
facts, a moral philosopher can show that a moral decision or judgment is mistaken if he can show that
the moral decision or judgment is incompatible with the moral decisions or judgments that would be
made by any impartial rational person.”); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY 20 (1963)
(distinguishing “positive morality,” the “morality actually accepted and shared by a given social
group,” from “critical morality,” the “general moral principles used in the criticism of actual social
institutions including positive morality”).
128. MICHAEL DAVIS, THINKING LIKE AN ENGINEER: STUDIES IN THE ETHICS OF A PROFESSION
97 (1998).
129. MICHAEL S. PRITCHARD, PROFESSIONAL INTEGRITY 160 (2006).
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tered mediation ethics is a critical account of mediation ethics that regards fairness, justice, and unconscionability as normative concepts that can be rationally
and impartially defined and distinguished from the subjective perceptions of
them by the mediator.130 This alternative encourages the ethical mediator to
look beyond the parties’ and his or her own personal views and beliefs, and to
justify his or her decisions on the basis of external criteria.
The previous discussion suggests that Menkel-Meadow was right in her refusal to mediate Ahmed’s and Ziba’s case on their terms. However, her decision would have carried more weight and been more helpful to other mediators
had she grounded it in a general theory of ethics rather than in a personal sense
of ethics. I believe she would have been more likely to do so had the Model
Standards stated the ethical obligations of mediators more clearly. In my view,
if mediators became more cognizant of the fact that their obligations lie with
their profession and the public as well as with the parties, and if they were
trained to assign weight to these obligations and accommodate them with their
familiar loyalty to the parties, ethical decision making would become more
structured, clear, and less personal.
E. Too Limited Guidance on What to Do When Standards Conflict
Standards may conflict. One standard may conflict with another (for example, Self-determination with Impartiality), or with an external standard (for
example, Confidentiality with a court order for disclosure). In such an event
mediators have to weigh the conflicting norms, prioritize them, and choose the
normative source to be followed.
The guidance offered by the Model Standards on this process is quite limited. In their Note on Construction, the Model Standards provide that “[t]hese
Standards are to be read and construed in their entirety. There is no priority
significance attached to the sequence in which the Standards appear.”131 This
point is made again in the Reporter’s Notes, which note that “[t]he interpretative
principle that mandates that each Standard be read and interpreted in such a
manner as to promote consistency with all other Standards is the presumed operative principle guiding the drafting of the Model Standards . . . .”132
The guidance of the Model Standards on events in which a standard conflicts with an external normative source is slightly more detailed. They state
130. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 290–99; SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 11 § 11.3
(discussing mediators’ duty of fairness).
131. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction.
132. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 7.
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that “a mediator should make every effort to comply with the spirit and intent
of these Standards in resolving such conflicts,”133 and the Reporter’s Notes add
that “a mediator ought to conduct oneself in a manner that retains and remains
faithful to as much of the spirit and intent of the affected Standard, and all other
Standards, as is possible.”134
This general guidance is followed by more pointed guidance in the phrasing
of some of the standards. For example, the Standard of Self-determination provides that “a mediator may need to balance . . . party self-determination [for
process design] with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process in accordance with these Standards.”135 However, other standards, such as the Standard
of Impartiality, do not refer to possible conflicts at all.
It is submitted that the Model Standards must be carefully redrafted to better respond to potential conflicts between standards. For example, the Standard
of Self-determination does not explain what balancing means, how the act of
balancing is performed, and whether balancing applies to decisions other than
process design. The Reporter’s Notes on these points offer better, though incomplete guidance, providing that
while parties can exercise self-determination in the selection of
their mediator, a mediator must consider Standard III: Conflicts of Interests and Standard IV: Competence when deciding
whether to accept the invitation to serve. Alternatively, the interplay among Standards may result in a conflict; a mediator,
for example, may feel pulled in conflicting directions when the
mediator, duty-bound to support party self-determination
(Standard I), recognizes that parties are trying to design a process that is not mediation but want to call it mediation to gain
confidentiality protections, thereby undermining the mediator’s obligation to sustain a quality process (Standard VI).
Standard I(A)(1) and I(B) explicitly recognize this potential for
conflict and indicates to the mediator that sustaining a quality
process places limits on the extent to which party autonomy,
external influences, and mediator self-interest should shape
participant conduct.136
The Reporter’s Notes, therefore, clearly see “balancing” as extending to
mediation decisions other than process design, and this should be reflected in
the language of the Standard of Self-determination.137
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Note on Construction.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 8.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.1.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 9.
See Omer Shapira, A Theory of Sharing Decision-Making in Mediation, 44 MCGEORGE L.
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Moving beyond the particular case of the Standard of Self-determination,
the Model Standards should state clearly at the outset that all the standards are
relative, not absolute, and that no standard has a prima-facie priority over another.138 There are probably no readymade answers to potential conflicts between standards but more helpful guidance could be provided. It is submitted
that a clearer direction could be incorporated into the Model Standards instructing mediators that in the event that their obligations seem to conflict, they must
(a) search for an alternative course of action that is consistent with all of the
standards; and (b) terminate or withdraw from the mediation when they cannot
prevent the violation, minimizing as far as possible the harm resulting from it.
For example, where the parties need legal information in order to make an
informed decision (in accordance with the Standard of Self-determination), and
the mediator may not provide that information him- or herself (because to do
so would be a violation of the Standards of Impartiality or Quality of the Process), the mediator should attempt to resolve this conflict of standards by looking for an alternative course of action which is consistent with the Model Standards as a whole. For example, he or she may suggest that the parties receive
outside expert advice. In many cases this direction will suffice.
In other cases it might not. For example, a mediator in a divorce case may
learn from Party A that he or she is hiding assets from Party B, who is unaware
of these assets. The mediator cannot reveal that information to Party B, as it is
protected by the Standard of Confidentiality, but equally cannot remain passive
because (a) on these facts Party B cannot exercise self-determination (a violation of the Standard of Self-determination), and (b) it seems that the process is
being abused by Party A (a violation of the Standard of Quality of the Process).
If Party A insists on keeping the information to him- or herself it would seem
that the way to reconcile the conflicting standards would be to bring the mediation to an end while minimizing any possible violation of the standards,
namely (in this case), without revealing the reason for the mediator’s decision
to Party B.139

REV. 923, 940–43 (2013).
138. See id. at 936 (noting “the relativity of mediation values” and arguing that
[n]o standard or rule has in-advance priority over all other standards or rules. For
example, it cannot be maintained that party self-determination is more important
than mediator impartiality, or that mediator impartiality is more important than
confidentiality and so forth. The weight of each norm must be ascertained in
context, and no norm always trumps the others.).
139. This scenario is discussed in Advisory Opinion of the North Carolina Dispute Resolution
Commission Opinion 10–16 (2010), http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/DRC/Documents/
10-16r_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/54UY-SEB8].
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F. The Missing Standards: Deconstructing the Standard of Quality of the
Process into Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Respect, Professional
Integrity, and Fairness
The Model Standards have a nine-standard architecture, which was kept
during their revision in 2005.140 While each standard focuses on a particular
ethical concern—for example, party self-determination, mediator impartiality,
conflicts of interest, and so on—one standard stands out as an exception. The
Standard of Quality of the Process is aimed at advancing a quality process.141
It is the most detailed of the Model Standards, purporting to deal with a variety
of issues, including “diligence, timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate
participants, party participation, procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all participants.”142 The following discussion raises serious
concerns about the scope, content, integrity, and goals of the Standard of Quality of the Process, and calls for a comprehensive revision of it that will fundamentally change the current structure of the Model Standards.
1. The Imprecise Scope of the Standard of Quality of the Process
The Quality of the Process Standard has been described by the Reporter’s
Notes as “a series of distinct, concrete ways in which a mediator could act to
advance a quality process.”143 One problem with this statement is that a quality
process may be advanced in many ways already covered by the other standards,
for example by impartial practice, mediator competence, informed party decision-making, and preservation of confidentiality. The standard is therefore too
narrow in this respect and reads as an arbitrary and partial list of possible ways
that can contribute to good practice.
2. Misplaced Elements that Belong to Other Existing Standards
Having noted the vague scope of the term “quality process,” which can
equally apply to other standards as well, a closer look at the Quality of the Process Standard indeed reveals that it covers issues belonging to other existing
standards. The most notable example is “party competency,” which is referred
to both in the statement in section VI.A and in subsection VI.A.10, the latter
providing that “[i]f a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty participating in a mediation, the
140.
141.
142.
143.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1.
Id. at Standard VI.
Id. at Standard VI.A.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 17.
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mediator should explore the circumstances and potential accommodations,
modifications or adjustments that would make possible the party’s capacity to
comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”144 The Reporter’s
Notes comment on this provision reveals that it was designed to benefit “persons with recognized disabilities,”145 assuming, so it seems, that “ordinary” mediation parties always comprehend the process, issues, and options, and have
no difficulty participating in the mediation. It is argued that in effect subsection
VI.A.10 addresses a general obligation of mediators, which is part of their duty
to “conduct a mediation based on the principle of party self-determination,”146
and to be mindful of any “party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”147 This provision therefore addresses a component
of party self-determination and belongs to the Standard of Self-determination.
3. A Mismatch between the Standard’s Statement and the Provisions
that Follow
One might presume that provisions VI.A.1–9 follow from and elaborate on
the standard’s statement in section VI.A. However, this is hardly the case. As
noted above, section VI.A provides that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation
in accordance with these Standards and in a manner that promotes diligence,
timeliness, safety, presence of the appropriate participants, party participation,
procedural fairness, party competency and mutual respect among all participants.”148 Diligence is referred to in provision VI.A.1, and timeliness in provision VI.A.2. Safety is not mentioned in any of section VI.A’s provisions, but
is referred to in section VI.B. The presence of appropriate participants is addressed in provision VI.A.3. Party participation is discussed in provision
VI.A.10. Procedural fairness is not mentioned explicitly as a term or concept
in any of the provisions, and as it is left undefined by the Model Standards, one
can only wonder whether it is or is not reflected in the content of some of them.
Party competency is referred to in provision VI.A.10, while mutual respect
among all participants is not mentioned in any of the provisions.
The reader is therefore left to wonder: the elements of a quality process that
make up the statement in section VI.A do not correspond with the subsequent
provisions, neither in the order in which these elements are set nor in the content of the provisions, which seem to cover some of the elements but ignore
others. Likewise, uncertainty surrounds provisions VI.A.4–9 which are not ex-

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 19.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.
Id. at Standard VI.A.10.
Id. at Standard VI.A.
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plicitly referred to in the statement of section VI.A. What is the guiding principle behind them? Are they, for lack of other candidates in section VI.A, illustrations of procedural fairness? Clearly, if section VI.A is to stay it must be
redrafted to enable readers to easily identify the components of a quality process and the corresponding provisions that define and explain these components.
4. The Missing Standards Hiding in the Standard of Quality of the
Process
A close examination of the Standard of Quality of the Process reveals that
in effect it is comprised of five separate standards: diligence, honesty, respect,
party self-determination, and professional integrity. While self-determination
is a standard in its own right (Standard I), the other four are not recognized by
the Model Standards as independent standards. It is submitted that each of
these standards deserves its own independent status. Since I cannot offer a full
account of these standards here,149 the following discussion merely aims to flesh
out the various rationales that are served by the Standard of Quality of the Process, and point to the way it can be reorganized and reconstructed within a new
set of standards. Doing so, it is further argued, will enhance the clarity of the
Model Standards’ ethical guidance to mediators and other mediation participants.
a. Diligence
Mediators,

150

like lawyers,

151

judges,152 and other professionals must act

149. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 4, 8, & 9 (discussing the meaning of these standards).
150. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 95, at R. 3.857(a); CODE OF ETHICS FOR
MEDIATORS Standard 3(c) (amended 2013) (ALA. CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 1995), http://alabamaadr.org/web/roster-documents/documents/med_Mediator_Code_of_Ethics_150501_updated.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JL8E-YW56] [hereinafter ALABAMA CODE]; STANDARDS OF ETHICS AND PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTIFIED MEDIATORS § K.1, at 7 (JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF VA. 2011), http://
www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/soe.pdf [https://perma.cc/F23RZ8DK] [hereinafter VIRGINIA STANDARDS]; FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.430, at 113;
ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR MEDIATORS Standard V, at 32–33 (GA. COMM’N ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
1994)
http://godr.org/sites/default/files/Godr/supreme_court_adr_rules/APPENDIX%20C,%20CHAP%201,%206-18-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6NXD-3LD8] [hereinafter GEORGIA STANDARDS].
151. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, at 17 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016), available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html [https://perma.cc/W23K-3EG6].
152. See, e.g., CODE OF CONDUCT FOR U.S. JUDGES Canon 3 (JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
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with diligence. Without attempting to draft a comprehensive Standard of Diligence at the moment, it seems that the distinction that the Model Standards
suggest between “diligence” and “timeliness” is unnecessary, because an obligation of diligence encompasses both the requirement to be “prepared to commit the attention essential to an effective mediation” (VI.A.1, emphasis added),
and to be able to “satisfy the reasonable expectation of the parties concerning
the timing of a mediation” (VI.A.2, emphasis added). The diligence rule that
applies to lawyers, for example, refers to commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client, controlled workload, and avoidance of procrastination.153
One aspect of diligence, therefore, is the provision of services on time, without delay, and in the context of a mediation a delay should be judged not only
by reference to external criteria such as a hearing date at court, but by reference
to the parties’ preferences regarding timing as well. If the parties indicate that
they expect the mediator to be available to them in the next month, and he or
she is unable to meet that reasonable expectation concerning the timing of the
mediation, taking the case and failing to meet that expectation would be in
breach of the mediator’s duty of diligence, because the mediation will not be
held within the timeframe legitimately expected by the parties. It is suggested,
therefore, that what the Model Standards term “diligence” and “timeliness”
should be brought together under an independent Standard of Diligence, which
includes the intention and ability to both commit the attention necessary for an
effective mediation, and respond to their needs and expectations regarding timing without undue delay.
b. Honesty
Although section VI.A does not refer to a mediator obligation concerning
honesty as an element of a quality process, provision VI.A.4 does, providing
that “[a] mediator should promote honesty and candor between and among all
participants, and a mediator shall not knowingly misrepresent any material fact
or circumstance in the course of a mediation.”154 Again, I do not wish to elaborate on the meaning of mediator honesty at the moment. Instead I would like
to point out that honesty is an important feature of professional conduct155 and

U.S.
2014),
http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-judges
[https://perma.cc/662Y-2K6X].
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, supra note 151, R. 1.3 cmt., at 17.
154. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.4.
155. See, e.g., MICHAEL D. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 79–80 (Kenneth King & Donna
Oberholtzer eds., 1981).
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should be recognized as such by the Model Standards within a separate Standard of Honesty.156
Furthermore, we should recognize that mediator honesty is not only a matter of process quality, but a legitimate expectation of parties of a trustworthy
professional as well. Professor Arthur A. Chaykin, for example, correctly observed that “[mediation] parties rely on the mediator to be truthful and honest.” 157 A dishonest mediator not only undermines the quality of the mediation,
but also betrays the parties’ trust that he or she be truthful and avoid lying and
deception. Thus, the obligation of honesty should not be relegated to a subsection of a Standard of Quality of the Process. Rather, it ought to be upgraded
into a separate Standard of Honesty standing in its own right, comprised of,
inter alia, a duty of mediators to conduct mediations with honesty and encourage honesty between participants.
c. Respect
Respect is mentioned as a component of a quality process in the statement
in section VI.A, which provides that “[a] mediator shall conduct a mediation
. . . in a manner that promotes . . . mutual respect among all participants.”158
This element is not referred to again in any subsequent provision of the Model
Standards. The reader might speculate that provision VI.A.4, which instructs
the mediator to promote “honesty and candor” between participants, is aimed
at promoting respect among participants, but are “respect” and “honesty and
candor” the same? And if they are, should it not be made explicitly clear?
In my view, respect and honesty are different aspects of ethical behavior.
Respect is a norm which focuses on the preservation of the dignity of participants, instructing the mediator to avoid the use of abusive, discriminatory, and
humiliating language, and calling on mediators to encourage the participants to
act accordingly.159 Like honesty, respect reflects a legitimate expectation of
mediators to be worthy of the parties’ trust. 160 Respect is not only a way to
advance a quality process, but a fundamental duty of the mediator in conducting

156. See, e.g., Kovach, supra note 13, at 136–37.
157. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. CIN.
L. REV. 731, 744 (1984).
158. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.
159. See, e.g., Luban’s treatment of the concept of dignity in DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS AND
HUMAN DIGNITY 70–71, 88 (2007).
160. See, e.g., BAYLES, supra note 155.
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a mediation.161 The Model Standards, therefore, were correct to include a reference to respect in the statement in section VI.A but should have elaborated
on its meaning, assigned it more weight, and constructed it as an independent
Standard of Respect comprised of, inter alia, a duty of mediators to conduct
mediations with respect, and a duty to promote mutual respect among participants. I cannot offer a detailed account of such a standard here, but I believe
that there is a sound basis for the development and adoption of a Standard of
Respect within a new construction of Model Standards.162
d. Party Self-determination
The statement in section VI.A refers to two components of quality process
which are further discussed in provision VI.A.10: the promotion of party competency and party participation.163 These components actually belong with the
Standard of Self-determination, which is an independent standard (Standard I).
Self-determination, which is recognized by the Model Standards as “a fundamental principle of mediation practice,”164 is defined by them as “the act of
coming to a voluntary, uncoerced decision in which each party makes free and
informed choices as to process and outcome.”165 Self-determination can only
take place where the parties have the capacity or competency to make decisions,
and therefore the element of party capacity or competency should be part of the
Standard of Self-determination.
With respect to party participation, the way it appears in provision VI.A.10
ties it with the Standard of Self-determination as well: it refers to “difficulty
participating in a mediation” and to steps the mediator should take to “make
possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”166 If the drafters of the Model Standards wanted mediators to
encourage party participation as a general value of mediation,167 that is, in any
mediation irrespective of difficulties hampering participation or disabilities,
this is not made clear.168 Moreover, we should recognize that party participation in the process is in itself an issue subject to party choice. In other words,
a mediator should encourage parties to participate in order to give them more
161. Id.
162. For such an account, see SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 9 § 9.2.
163. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.
164. Id. at Standard I.A.1.
165. Id. at Standard I.A.
166. Id. at Standard VI.A.10.
167. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001).
168. On the contrary, the REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 19, refers to provision VI.A.10
as addressing the situation of mediation with persons with recognized disabilities.
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opportunity to exercise self-determination with regard to the content and design
of the process, but it is up to the parties to decide on the extent of their participation in the process.
e. Professional Integrity
Provisions VI.A.3, VI.A.5–9, and sections VI.B and VI.C cover a wide
range of issues under the general heading of “quality process,” including the
presence or absence of persons at a mediation,169 provision of information by
the mediator,170 inadequate labeling of a process as mediation, recommendation
of other dispute resolution processes,171 undertaking of additional dispute resolution roles in the same matter,172 use of mediation to further criminal conduct,173 domestic abuse or violence among the parties,174 and conduct that jeopardizes conducting the mediation consistent with the standards.175 What is the
connection between these issues, besides their association with “quality”? Do
they have common themes? Can they be reorganized in a more meaningful
way?
I want to suggest that all these instances manifest an underlying obligation
of mediators that exceeds their duties to the parties. They illustrate mediators’
commitment to interests other than the parties’; a commitment to the interests
of the profession of mediation and the public to protect the process of mediation, that is, a responsibility of mediators to preserve the institution of mediation
and public trust in it.
I will call this underlying responsibility a duty of integrity. Some codes of
conduct for mediators refer to this duty explicitly. The Georgia Ethical Standards for Mediators, for example, provide that “[a] mediator is the guardian of
the integrity of the mediation process,”176 and the California Dispute Resolution
Council (CDRC) Standards of Practice for California Mediators state that
“[e]very mediator bears the responsibility of conducting mediations in a manner
that . . . promotes trust in the integrity . . . of mediators.”177 None of the codes,
however, defines integrity.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.3.
Id. at Standard VI.A.5.
Id. at Standard VI.A.6, VI.A.7.
Id. at Standard VI.A.8.
Id. at Standard VI.A.9.
Id. at Standard VI.B.
Id. at Standard VI.C.
GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard IV.B, at 31.
STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR CALIFORNIA MEDIATORS pmbl. (CAL. DISPUTE
RESOLUTION COUNCIL), http://www.cdrc.net/mediator-standards [https://perma.cc/FX9D-PMKX].
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Integrity, it is suggested, is the quality of being complete or whole,178 and I
would argue that a mediator exhibits professional integrity when in doing his
or her job he or she is truly committed to the definition of his or her role and to
the values and principles associated with that role.179 Thus, a mediator who is
truly committed to his or her role must conduct a “whole” or “complete” process. Provisions VI.A.3, VI.A.5–9, VI.B and VI.C are in fact illustrations of
four distinct aspects of professional integrity, which are briefly discussed next.
i.

An Exercise of Professional Discretion

A process of mediation will not be “complete” or “whole” where persons
whose presence is important for the mediation to be effective are absent.180 As
a matter of integrity, mediators are expected to exercise professional discretion,
raise this issue with the parties, and make them aware of it.181 This, it is submitted, is the true rationale of provision VI.A.3, which is an illustration of the
duty to exercise professional discretion, providing that “[t]he presence or absence of persons at a mediation depends on the agreement of the parties and the
mediator. The parties and mediator may agree that others may be excluded
from particular sessions or from all sessions.”182
The reader of this provision should already know, by reason of the Standard
of Self-determination and its application to decisions on process-design, that
parties ought to be involved in the decision on the presence or absence of persons at the mediation.183 What justifies the inclusion of this provision in the
Model Standards is the new element which is introduced by provision VI.A.3,
namely that the mediator should be a party to the decision, a requirement which
stems from the mediator’s duty to conduct a whole or complete process. What
is missing from the current provision, therefore, is a reference to the responsibility of the mediator for bringing up the issue of the presence or absence of
persons in a mediation in the first place, when, in his or her professional judgment, it has a bearing on the effectiveness of the mediation.
ii.

Separation of Professional Roles and Services

Provision VI.A.5 illustrates another aspect of process integrity rather than

178. See, e.g., PRITCHARD, supra note 129, at 67.
179. On the meaning of professional integrity, see DAMIAN COX ET AL., INTEGRITY AND THE
FRAGILE SELF 103 (2003).
180. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.3.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at Standard I.A.
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a component of quality: the separation of professional roles and services.184 It
provides that “[t]he role of a mediator differs substantially from other professional roles. Mixing the role of a mediator and the role of another profession is
problematic and thus, a mediator should distinguish between the roles.”185 This
is not a matter of quality but one of integrity: mediation is not arbitration, counseling, or neutral evaluation, and the provision of services other than mediation
by mediators in processes presented as mediation undermines both the integrity
of the particular mediations and that of the institution of mediation.
Provision VI.A.8 complements provision VI.A.5. It envisions situations in
which mediators switch roles to another dispute resolution role and conditions
it upon the parties’ informed consent: “A mediator shall not undertake an additional dispute resolution role in the same matter without the consent of the parties. Before providing such service, a mediator shall inform the parties of the
implications of the change in process and obtain their consent to the change.”186
This requirement is in line with the Standard of Self-determination, which ties
party self-determination with informed choices.187 Like provision VI.A.5, this
provision is about integrity, not quality, warning mediators of the dangers of
mixing professional roles. The provision lacks a reminder that mediators may
only do so if they can proceed with the new role without violating mediation
standards such as confidentiality and conflicts of interest, which have a continuing application subsequent to the mediation. For example, the Standard of
Conflicts of Interest provides in this context that “[s]ubsequent to a mediation,
a mediator shall not establish another relationship with any of the participants
in any matter that would raise questions about the integrity of the mediation.”188
iii.

The Appropriateness of a Case to Mediation

Provision VI.A.7 provides that “[a] mediator may recommend, when appropriate, that parties consider resolving their dispute through arbitration, counseling, neutral evaluation or other processes.”189 What is the purpose of reminding mediators to do so? The Reporter’s Notes on this point seems almost
apologetic: “it certainly is plausible for a mediator to recommend, when appropriate, that the parties consider resolving their dispute through some other thirdparty process.”190
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at Standard VI.A.5.
Id.
Id. at Standard VI.A.8.
Id. at Standard I.A.
Id. at Standard III.F.
Id. at Standard VI.A.7.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18.
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It is argued that the wording of this provision misses an important point
which becomes apparent once one reads it with the rationale of protecting the
integrity of the mediation and the mediator in mind: a mediator must consider
whether mediation is appropriate for the dispute and must recommend that the
parties consider other processes if he or she considers mediation to be an inappropriate process for the dispute or if he or she considers other procedures to
be more appropriate than mediation.191
Compare, for example, the Model Standards’ provision to the Florida
Rules, which provide that “[a] mediator is responsible for confirming that mediation is an appropriate dispute resolution process under the circumstances of
each case,”192 and to the Texas Ethical Guidelines for Mediators, which note
that “[a] mediator should postpone, recess, or terminate the mediation process
if it is apparent to the mediator that the case is inappropriate for mediation.”193
Again, behind all these provisions lies the concern for the integrity of mediation: conducting mediation when doing so is inappropriate or less appropriate
than other dispute resolution procedures could jeopardize its integrity. This
aspect of integrity should be in mind when section VI.B is read: “If a mediator
is made aware of domestic abuse or violence among the parties, the mediator
shall take appropriate steps including, if necessary, postponing, withdrawing
from or terminating the mediation.”194
iv.

The Prevention of Process Abuse or Substantial Defects in the
Process

Provisions VI.A.6 and VI.A.9 and subsection VI.C together make an important statement that the Model Standards hesitate to present straightforwardly: that mediators have a responsibility to conduct mediation in a manner
that does not allow for process abuse or substantive defects in the process.195
This is another aspect of process integrity, that is the conduct of a “whole” process in accordance with its values and principles, a process which neither is
abused (used for purposes for which it has not been designed) nor suffers from
serious defects (key elements of the process are missing).
Provision VI.A.6, for example, provides that “[a] mediator shall not conduct a dispute resolution procedure other than mediation but label it mediation

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.
FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.400, at 111.
TEXAS GUIDELINES, supra note 95, at § 13.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.B.
Id. at Standards VI.A.6, VI.A.9, VI.C.
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in an effort to gain the protection of rules, statutes, or other governing authorities pertaining to mediation.”196 This provision is not about the “quality” of the
process, but rather on the inconsistency between a “true” process of mediation
with integrity and a process which is (to use the Reporter’s Notes words) the
product of “a ruse of labeling a dispute resolution process as ‘mediation’ in
order to get its benefits.”197 This is a clear example of the duty of mediators to
safeguard the integrity of mediation.
Provision VI.A.9 makes a similar point, providing that “[i]f a mediation is
being used to further criminal conduct, a mediator should take appropriate steps
including, if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”198 It is quite clear that mediation, like any legitimate dispute resolution process, must be carried out in line with the rule of law, and any use of
mediation to further illegal purposes would be an abuse of process and result in
a defective mediation. Moreover, as commentators such as Robert A. Baruch
Bush,199 John W. Cooley,200 and myself201 have observed, allowing mediation
to be used for illegal purposes or to produce illegal outcomes is likely to bring
mediation into disrepute, harming the standing of mediation and undermining
public trust in the profession and process of mediation. With this rationale in
mind, provision VI.A.9 seems wanting in at least two respects: first, its unjustified focus on criminal rather than illegal conduct—the product of the revision
of the 1994 version of the Model Standards which did refer to illegal conduct202—because using mediation to further illegal conduct is also an unwarranted abuse of the process that undermines its integrity; and second, its omission to expressly address the responsibility of mediators with regard to illegal
mediated agreements.203
Subsection VI.C is a sort of default clause, triggering, without using these
precise words, a mediators’ duty to intervene in incidents of process abuse,
providing that “[i]f a mediator believes that participant conduct, including that
of the mediator, jeopardizes conducting a mediation consistent with these
196. Id. at Standard VI.A.6.
197. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 18.
198. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9.
199. Robert A. Baruch Bush, A Study of Ethical Dilemmas and Policy Implications, 1994 J. OF
DISP. RESOL. 1, 24 (1994).
200. John W. Cooley, A Classical Approach to Mediation—Part I: Classical Rhetoric and the
Art of Persuasion in Mediation, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 83, 130 (1993).
201. Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 956.
202. Compare MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9., with MODEL STANDARDS
OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard VI (1994); Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 17 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 323, 328–29 (1997).
203. See infra Section II.G.2.
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Standards, a mediator shall take appropriate steps including, if necessary, postponing, withdrawing from or terminating the mediation.”204 If, for example, a
mediator has reason to believe that one party is concealing vital information
from the other party, or hidden assets that are relevant to the dispute, the mediator will have a duty to take some action to prevent the process from being
abused. Subsection VI.B may also illustrate such an event, where the mediator
suspects that the voluntariness of the process and the self-determination of one
of the parties are threatened by domestic abuse or violence among the parties.
v.

A Summary of the Argument on Professional Integrity

It is submitted, therefore, that provisions VI.A.3 and VI.A.5–9 and subsections VI.B and VI.C of the Standard of Quality of the Process should be regrouped and reorganized under a Standard of Professional Integrity. The new
standard will guide mediators on their responsibility to protect the integrity of
the process, identifying four aspects of professional integrity: Exercise of Professional Discretion, Separation of Professional Roles and Services, The Appropriateness of a Case to Mediation, and The Prevention of Process Abuse or
Substantial Defects in the Process.
5. Moving from Procedural Fairness (as a Component of a Quality
Process) to a Standard of Fairness
The last conceptual issue I would like to draw attention to with respect to
the Standard of Quality of the Process is its wanting treatment of fairness. The
Model Standards use the term “procedural fairness” to indicate one way of promoting a quality process.205 Fairness, however, is defined by neither the Model
Standards nor the Reporter’s Notes. As observed above, it is difficult to ascertain which of the provisions of subsection VI.A is an expression of fairness.
Elsewhere I have offered a detailed account of the meaning of fairness in
the context of mediation.206 One meaning of fairness that I identified was fairness as “playing by the rules,” which means, in the context of mediation, following the rules that apply to mediation. On the basis of that account of fairness, it seems to me that by holding mediators to a norm of procedural fairness
without saying more, the Model Standards merely instruct mediators to follow
the standards that already apply to them in the conduct of mediation, namely

204. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.C.
205. Id. at Standard VI.A.
206. Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117.
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respect party self-determination, be competent, act impartially, disclose conflicts of interest, preserve confidentiality, and so on.207 In other words, the reference in the Model Standards to “procedural fairness” as a normative concept
does not promote the “quality” of mediation beyond the threshold that the
standards already delineate in the language of their provisions. Any additional
promise of “quality” will require the Model Standards to adopt a notion of fairness which I referred to as a substantive conception of fairness.208
A substantive conception of fairness is an attitude toward rules that prefers
substance over form; understands, construes, applies, and enforces rules flexibly; and accommodates circumstances, context, and reality in accordance with
the purpose and spirit of the rules.209 For example, an insistence on informed
consent as an ingredient of party self-determination (while treating formal consent as illusionary self-determination) is to insist on “quality” consent consistent with a conception of substantive fairness.210 To take another example,
to insist on mediator impartiality (or neutrality) while ignoring power imbalances between parties is to award priority to form over substance, that is, to
prefer in effect the stronger party over the weaker and sacrifice the “quality” or
substantive fairness of the process.211 This approach to the interpretation and
application of the standards applies to all of them and should, it is argued, be
grounded in a separate Standard of Fairness in the Model Standards.
G. Ignoring the Accountability of Mediators to Outcomes
The Model Standards regard mediation outcomes as falling within the jurisdiction of the parties, providing in the Standard of Self-determination that
outcomes are subject to party self-determination and therefore should be produced by the parties.212 They do not explicitly refer to a responsibility of mediators for the content of mediation outcomes. Moreover, nowhere do they refer to any criteria that mediated outcomes should meet.
The general impression the reader gets, therefore, is that whatever the parties decide should suffice. Harold Abramson, for example, observed in the
course of analyzing the ethical dilemma scenario discussed earlier, that the
207. Id. at 290–94 (discussing formal fairness).
208. Id. at 295–99.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., id. at 298–99; see also REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 16 (The meaning
the Reporter’s Notes to the Model Standards assign to the word “consent” in the Standard of Confidentiality, while discussing different approaches of mediators to matters disclosed by mediation parties
in a caucus: “Whichever practice is adopted by a mediator, Standard V (B) affirms that it is a mediator’s
duty to insure that party consent to the approach is known, meaningful and timely.”) (emphasis added).
211. See, e.g., Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 304–10.
212. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.
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Model Standards “require mediators to focus on process fairness and assume
that when process fairness is ensured, substantive fairness will follow”;213 they
“steer clear of discussions of fairness, equity, and substantive justice,”214 and
“do not hold mediators accountable for the substantive fairness of the mediation
agreements they help to orchestrate.”215
I think that if this is indeed the Model Standards’ approach to outcome accountability then it is wrong.216 I believe, however, that the Model Standards’
guidance on the process of mediation provides two hints regarding the criteria
for mediated outcomes, which could be interpreted as an implied and partial
(although far from satisfying) recognition of mediator accountability for outcomes. These instances are discussed next under two headings: uninformed
outcomes and illegal outcomes.
1. Uninformed Outcomes
The Standard of Self-determination places mediators under a duty to conduct the mediation on the basis of party self-determination,217 which is defined,
inter alia, as the act of making “informed choices as to . . . outcome.”218 Logically, this should lead to finding here a responsibility of the mediator for the
outcome of mediation, because if a mediated outcome is not the product of an
informed decision, and the mediator is aware of that, then arguably the mediator
has not complied with his or her duty to conduct a mediation based on party
self-determination.
However, the Model Standards shy away from this conclusion and prefer
to dilute it by providing that “[a] mediator cannot personally ensure that each
party has made free and informed choices to reach particular decisions, but,
where appropriate, a mediator should make the parties aware of the importance
of consulting other professionals to help them make informed choices.”219 The
Reporter’s Notes explain this choice with the “significant controversy about
whether and how a mediator might insure that a party’s decisions are suitably
informed.”220

213. MEDIATION ETHICS, supra note 7, at 329.
214. Id.
215. Id. See also id. at 115 (Waldman noting that “the Standards are silent on the matter of
substantive fairness”).
216. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 334–39 (arguing for mediators’ accountability for
outcomes).
217. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A (“A mediator shall conduct a mediation
based on the principle of party self-determination.”).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. Id. at Standard I.A.2.
220. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 10.
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In my view this is not a convincing argument. Many standards for mediators are saddled with controversies and difficult to apply. Following the Reporter’s Notes’ line of thinking could result, for example, in mediators being
held unaccountable for conducting mediation with partiality (what does impartiality really mean?), for ignoring a conflict of interest (what counts as a conflict
of interest?), or for giving professional advice (did the mediator advise the parties, evaluate their case, or merely provide them with information?). Evading
the difficulty, as the Model Standards do, is surely not the right approach.
Elsewhere I have suggested a different approach, arguing that “[f]ollowing
logically from the duty to conduct mediations on the basis of party self-determination is a duty to prevent an outcome that a party agrees to without exercising self-determination—a decision that is involuntary, coerced, uninformed, or
made in a state of incapacity.”221 This approach is echoed in a number of codes
of conduct for mediators. The Mediation Council of Illinois (MCI) Professional Standards of Practice for Mediators (hereinafter: Illinois Standards), for
example, provide that the mediator has a duty to ensure that clients make informed decisions;222 the Florida Committee Notes to the Florida Rules note that
“[a] mediator must not . . . knowingly allow a participant to make a decision
based on misrepresented facts or circumstances”;223 the Alabama Code of Ethics for Mediators provides that “[a] mediator shall assist the parties in reaching
an informed . . . agreement”;224 and the Oregon Mediation Association Core
Standards of Mediation Practice provide that “[m]ediators should suspend, end,
or withdraw from the mediation if they believe a participant is unable to give
Informed Consent.”225
While I agree with the Model Standards that a mediator cannot ensure that
parties make decisions that are based on complete information, I believe it is
essential to clarify that mediators must take steps, consistent with the Standards,
so that party decision-making is based on the information relevant to the decision-making.226 I find some support for this view in the Model Standards themselves, in subsection VI.A.10 of the Standard of Quality of the Process. Subsection VI.A.10, which, as I have argued earlier, should be treated as part of the
Standard of Self-determination, provides that “[i]f a party appears to have dif-

221. Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 336 (emphasis added).
222. ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § VI.
223. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.310, at 106.
224. ALABAMA CODE, supra note 150, at Standard 4(a).
225. CORE STANDARDS OF MEDIATION PRACTICE Standard II cmt. 5 (OR. MEDIATION ASS’N
2005), http://www.omediate.org/pg61.cfm [https://perma.cc/6LV5-VP6Q].
226. See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at ch. 4 § 4.5.3.2.
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ficulty comprehending the . . . settlement options . . . the mediator should explore the circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications or adjustments that would make possible the party’s capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”227 In my view, this language should be
interpreted as an indirect and partial recognition of mediator responsibility for
informed mediated outcomes, and should be read as a sign to mediators to take
account of outcomes.
Certainly, the Model Standards do not go far enough on this issue, and
should be amended so as to include clearer guidance on mediators’ responsibilities regarding uninformed outcomes. Failure to recognize such responsibility
would be wrong for two reasons: first, mediation parties rely on their mediators
to support them in the process of mediation and provide them with a minimal
safety-net that will protect them from harm which the mediator is aware of or
reasonably expected to be aware of;228 and second, because such accountability
is necessary in order to preserve public trust in mediators and the institution of
mediation.229
2. Illegal Outcomes
Another hint as to some form of acknowledgment of mediator outcome accountability by the Model Standards can be found in subsection VI.A.9 of the
Standard of Quality of the Process, which instructs mediators to take appropriate steps when “a mediation is being used to further criminal conduct.”230 This
language, so it seems, could cover under certain circumstances a mediated
agreement to act in violation of the law. Again, this limited reference to potential mediator intervention due to the content of the mediation or its outcome is
inadequate and needs to be addressed.
The Model Standards should be much clearer on the expectations of mediators when the mediated outcome is illegal. The Georgia Standards, for example, clearly state in a Standard of Fairness that “[t]he mediator . . . must protect
the integrity of the process. . . . A mediator should not be a party to an agreement which is illegal . . . ;”231 and the Guide for Federal Employee Mediators
instructs mediators to withdraw from the mediation if the parties insist on an

227. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10 (emphasis added).
228. See Judith L. Maute, Mediator Accountability: Responding to Fairness Concerns, 1990 J.
DISP. RESOL. 347, 351 (1990).
229. Id. at 349.
230. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.9.
231. GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard IV, at 30.
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illegal agreement.232 Mediation commentators have also suggested that an illegal mediation outcome should prompt mediators into action. Bush, for example, argued that “if [the mediator] does nothing, he may bring mediation into
disrepute if the illegal agreements are later discovered”;233 Cooley noted that
“where the mediator or nonparties perceive, or could perceive, the resulting
agreement to be illegal . . . the mediator must apprise the parties of the problem,
redirect their efforts toward generating new, acceptable options, and, as a last
resort, withdraw as mediator and terminate the mediation;”234 and in an article
that explored the limitations on party self-determination in mediation, including
the parties’ right to make decisions on outcome, I argued that
a mediation that produces an illegal agreement jeopardizes mediation integrity because it might be perceived as an abuse of
process for unworthy goals, undermining important social interests such as preservation of the rule of law and encouragement of public use of mediation. An illegal mediated agreement ignores the rule of law and a process associated with such
an outcome might deter ordinary, law-abiding people from using it.235
Illegal outcomes, as well as uninformed outcomes, are merely examples of
possible mediated outcomes that mediators must not ignore, a category that may
also include unconscionable, grossly unfair, and immoral agreements.236 These
incidents all raise the same issue of mediators’ accountability for mediated out-

232. FEDERAL EMPLOYEE MEDIATORS GUIDE, supra note 4, at Federal Guidance Notes 1 to
Standard I.
233. Bush, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 199, at 24.
234. Cooley, supra note 200, at 130.
235. Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 956.
236. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.420(b)(4), at 112 (“A mediator shall . . .
terminate a mediation entailing . . . unconscionability . . . .”); VIRGINIA STANDARDS, supra note 150,
§ J (requiring mediators to withdraw if they “believe that manifest injustice would result if the agreement was signed”); see also Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelines for Ensuring
Fair and Effective Processes, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1100 (1990) (“[M]ediators and judges must
prevent parties from signing agreements that would be unconscionable under contract doctrine.”); Cooley, supra note 200, at 130 (noting that mediators must withdraw and terminate the mediation if the
resulting agreement is grossly inequitable, or based on false information); Kevin Gibson, Mediator
Attitudes Toward Outcomes: A Philosophical View, 17 MEDIATION Q. 197, 209 (1999) (“[M[ediation
should not endorse [unconscionable] agreements that would not be sanctioned by society.”); Maute,
supra note 228, at 348–49 (“[T]he mediator must intervene to avoid patently unfair agreements” and
“should refuse to finalize an agreement . . . where the agreement is so unfair that it would be a miscarriage of justice.”); Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 336 (“Mediators would be accountable for an
outcome to the extent that mediation rules or other external obligatory rules—i.e., rules of law and
morality—require them to take an action with respect to a mediation outcome.”).
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comes, sometimes referred to as accountability for substantive fairness or outcome fairness.237
The idea that mediators have outcome accountability is shared by many
mediation experts. Lawrence Susskind, for example, argued that mediators of
environmental disputes should ensure that mediated agreements take into account the interests of third parties238 and that mediators have an obligation to
the mediation profession to ensure that mediation produces quality agreements
that promote the reputation of the profession;239 Judith Maute claimed that
court-connected mediators are accountable for the effect of mediation on public
interests;240 Kevin Gibson argued that mediators sometimes have a duty to question the mediated agreement, noting that “[w]here issues of harm to self or others are involved, the mediator cannot be neutral in the sense of disinterested; he
or she has an affirmative obligation to make sure that some kinds of settlement
are questioned”;241 and Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger have recently
commented that “the dominant view in the field . . . [is] that substantive fairness
of outcome is indeed one of the mediator’s key responsibilities.” 242
In a recent article on the meaning of fairness in mediation, I have added
normative force to this “dominant view in the field” by pointing out the connection between the accountability of mediators for outcome and their ethical
duties towards the profession of mediation and the general public. Focusing on
the duty towards the profession, I argued that mediators must avoid conduct
that would harm the profession, and therefore must take steps to prevent mediation outcomes that might jeopardize the public’s confidence in mediation.
This obligation, owed to the profession rather than the parties, mitigates the
parties’ right to self-determination with the effect that the parties cannot relieve
the mediator of that responsibility by agreeing on an illegal, unconscionable, or
grossly unfair outcome.243 Moreover, on the basis of a mediators’ duty toward
the public not to harm important social interests such as the rule of law and
critical morality, I argued that mediators are required to take steps to prevent
illegal and immoral outcomes even when they do not jeopardize the institution
237. Maute, supra note 228, at 248.
238. Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L.
REV. 1, 14‒18 (1981).
239. Lawrence Susskind, Expanding the Ethical Obligations of the Mediator: Mediator Accountability to Parties Not at the Table, in WHAT’S FAIR: ETHICS FOR NEGOTIATORS 513, 516–17 (Carrie
Menkel-Meadow & Michael Wheeler eds., 2004).
240. Maute, supra note 228, at 358.
241. Gibson, supra note 236, at 209.
242. Robert A. Baruch Bush & Joseph P. Folger, Mediation and Social Justice: Risks and Opportunities, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 11 (2012).
243. See Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 324–27.
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of mediation.244
In view of the fact, then, that codes of conduct for mediators and mediation
scholars alike recognize mediator accountability for outcomes, there is a strong
basis for amending the Model Standards to offer a greater degree of accountability of mediators for mediation outcomes.
III. CRITIQUE OF PARTICULAR STANDARDS
The primary focus of Part II has been on major conceptual changes that the
Model Standards should undergo: a change in the definition of mediation; an
explicit extension of the application of the standards to mediation styles other
than problem-solving mediation; a clearer statement and consistent application
of the levels of guidance; an express recognition and statement of mediators’
duties other than their duties toward the parties, namely duties toward the profession, the public, and courts or referring bodies; inclusion of guidance on the
event that standards conflict; a fundamental change in the current structure of
the Model Standards through a deconstruction of the Standard of Quality of the
Process and its replacement with new Standards of Diligence, Honesty, Respect, Professional Integrity, and Fairness; and an open acknowledgement of
mediators’ accountability for mediation outcomes. The rest of the Article proceeds with a critical reading of particular standards, exposing defects in their
content which merit changes of a more local nature.
A. Self-determination
The Standard of Self-determination suffers from several weaknesses that
need to be addressed.
1. No Clear Message on the Allocation of Decision-making Power
between Parties and Mediators
The Model Standards recognize an extensive right of mediation parties to
“exercise self-determination at any stage of a mediation, including mediator
selection, process design, participation in or withdrawal from the process, and
outcomes.”245 At the same time the Standard of Self-determination provides
that “a mediator may need to balance such party self-determination [on process
design] with a mediator’s duty to conduct a quality process . . . .”246 It indicates,
therefore, that the parties’ right to self-determination is not without limitations
244. See id. at 329–34.
245. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard I.A.
246. Id. at Standard I.A.1.
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and mediators will sometimes have a duty to intervene in (or balance) the parties’ decision-making.
The standard’s focus on process design seems to me to be wrong, because
decisions on any mediation issue may require the mediator to intervene and
frustrate the parties’ choice. In fact, the Model Standards themselves illustrate
that point in other standards, such as the Standards of Impartiality, Conflicts of
Interest, and Confidentiality. For example, according to the Standard of Impartiality, mediators are not allowed to accept gifts and favors which raise a question of impartiality (notwithstanding the parties’ wishes);247 the Standard of
Conflicts of Interest provides that parties cannot select a mediator “[i]f a mediator’s conflict of interest might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of the mediation,” thus imposing a limitation on mediator selection;248 and
the Standard of Confidentiality recognizes that a mediator may be required by
law to disclose mediation information even where the parties object to such
disclosure.249 These are not process design decisions, yet the mediator legitimately intervenes in (or balances) the parties’ decisions. Moreover, as previously argued, mediators might have to intervene and terminate a mediation
when the parties agree on an outcome which is illegal or unconscionable.250
What is missing, therefore, from the current Standard of Self-determination is
a general statement which explains when and on what grounds mediators are
required to exercise balancing.251
2. Failure to Incorporate Party Competency as a Component of Selfdetermination
As noted previously, party competency, in the sense of a capacity to perceive information, understand it and participate in the mediation, is an important element of self-determination.252 At the moment, the Model Standards
refer to party competency in the Standard of the Quality of the Process, treating
it as an issue which is relevant to persons with disabilities, while I argue that it
should be incorporated instead into the Standard of Self-determination as an
integral part of exercising self-determination.253

247. Id. at Standard II.B.2, 3.
248. Id. at Standard III.E.
249. Id. at Standard V.A.
250. See supra Section II.G.2.
251. See Shapira, Decision-Making in Mediation, supra note 137, at 940–44, 959 (discussing the
meaning of balancing and suggesting a formulation of that concept).
252. See supra Section II.F.2.
253. See supra Section II.F.2.
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3. Wrong Approach to Informed Consent
As noted previously while discussing the accountability of mediators for
mediation outcomes, the guidance on informed decision-making provided by
the Standard of Self-determination is unsatisfactory.254 Mediators should be
placed under a duty to conduct mediations under conditions that enable parties
to make informed decisions, and the standard should clarify the circumstances
in which mediators ought to terminate the mediation for lack of informed consent.
B. Impartiality
The Standard of Impartiality requires extensive revision because its current
wording presents an unrealistic picture of a normative concept of impartiality.
1. Failure to Distinguish between Implicit and Explicit Bias
Impartiality, according to the Standard of Impartiality, “means freedom
from favoritism, bias or prejudice.”255 This definition is wrong because it does
not differentiate between implicit and explicit favoritism and bias. No one can
be expected to be free of feelings and thoughts of favoritism, bias or prejudice.256 What can legitimately be expected of mediators is to refrain from external manifestations of favoritism or bias between parties in word or action.257
Many codes of conduct for mediators capture this notion in their definitions of
impartiality, providing that impartiality means “freedom from favoritism or
bias in word, action, or appearance,”258 and so should the Model Standards.
2. Ignoring the Full Implications of Perceived Partiality
The Standard of Impartiality directs mediators to “conduct a mediation in

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra Section II.G.1.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A.
See SHAPIRA, supra note 19, at 212.
MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A.
FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, R. 10.330(a), at 107 (emphasis added); see also TEXAS
GUIDELINES, supra note 95, § 9 cmt ; MODEL STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR FAMILY AND DIVORCE
MEDIATION Standard IV.1 (SYMPOSIUM ON STANDARDS OF PRACTICE 2000), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/family/reports/mediation.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HP2A-KKR7] [hereinafter FAMILY MEDIATION MODEL STANDARDS]; ALABAMA
CODE, supra note 150, at Standard 5(a); GEORGIA STANDARDS, supra note 150, Standard III.A, at
27.
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an impartial manner and avoid conduct that gives the appearance of partiality.”259 This requirement should be tied with a concept of reasonableness, following the example of the Standard of Conflicts of Interest, according to which
we ask mediators to avoid conduct that might reasonably raise a question of a
mediator’s impartiality.260 It should be clear that we cannot be satisfied with a
merely subjective suspicion of partiality of the parties for the normative purpose
of assigning ethical responsibility to mediators,261 although for practical (as opposed to ethical) reasons mediators would do better to avoid any subjective suspicion of partiality as well. Thus, the Standard of Impartiality should be revised
to guide mediators to avoid partiality and any conduct that might reasonably
create the appearance of partiality.
A second defect of the current Standard of Impartiality lies in its failure to
treat the appearance of partiality as a ground for declining to accept a case and
withdrawal. The standard provides that “[a] mediator shall decline a mediation
if the mediator cannot conduct it in an impartial manner,”262 and “[i]f at any
time a mediator is unable to conduct a mediation in an impartial manner, the
mediator shall withdraw.”263 This wording might be wrongly interpreted by
mediators as leaving the question about impartiality completely in their hands,
that is, dependent on their personal evaluation of their ability to conduct the
mediation without favoritism or bias. The better view is that impartiality, like
conflicts of interest, must also be evaluated from a reasonable bystander’s point
of view, in order to ensure that the integrity of mediation is not jeopardized and
that public confidence in mediation is not undermined. The Florida Rules, for
example, state that “[a] mediator shall not accept or continue any engagement
for mediation services in which the ability to maintain impartiality is reasonably impaired or compromised.”264
The Standard of Impartiality should therefore be redrafted to accommodate
259. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, Standard II.B.
260. See, e.g., id. at Standard III.A, C, E.
261. See, e.g., MEMBERS CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT art. 8(3) (FAMILY MEDIATION CAN.), http:/
/fmc.ca/sites/default/files/sites/all/themes/fmc/images-user/Members%20Code%20of%20Professional%20Conduct_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/QP86-7LRQ] (“The perception by one or both of the participants that the mediator is partial does not in itself require the mediator to withdraw, but in such
circumstances, the mediator must remind both parties of their right to terminate the mediation.”) [hereinafter FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE].
262. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A.
263. Id. at Standard II.C.
264. FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.330, at 107 (emphasis added);
see also STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR N.Y. STATE CMTY. DISPUTE RESOLUTION CTR. MEDIATORS
Standard II, cmt. 2 (N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS. DIV. OF PROF’L AND COURT SERVS. 2009),
http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/adr/Publications/Info_for_Programs/Standards_of_Conduct.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q7NH-YPG3].
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this concern, conditioning the acceptance of cases and mandating a withdrawal
in circumstances that raise a reasonable concern of partiality or an appearance
of partiality that could undermine the institution of mediation and public trust
in it.
3. Failure to Distinguish between Legitimate and Illegitimate Favoritism
The Standard of Impartiality places mediators under a duty not to favor one
party over another (“freedom from favoritism”), but does not explain what that
means and how it can be achieved in practice.265 A mediator could understand
it to mean that parties should always be treated in the same manner, for example, that parties should be allocated the same amount of time for relating their
stories, or that where one party is met separately the other party should also be
met separately. However, the same treatment (or same mediator conduct) could
have different effects on the parties. For example, the mediator might provide
the same information to both parties (for example, on the importance of their
seeking legal advice) with the result that the information favors Party A (who
is unaware of his or her legal rights). To complicate matters even more, inaction by the mediator could also favor one of the parties. For example, in the
previous example the decision not to provide the information might favor Party
B.
A realistic approach to impartiality must therefore take into account the realities of everyday practice, address these issues, and offer mediators a complex
yet plausible concept of impartiality that goes beyond the slogan “freedom from
favoritism.” Such a concept would recognize the inevitableness of favoritism,
most notably in circumstances of an imbalance of power between the parties,266
and seek to distinguish legitimate favoritism from illegitimate favoritism.
In effect the Model Standards already embrace this idea in a limited way.
Section VI.A.10 of the Standard of Quality of the Process, which has been mentioned previously in a different context, explicitly recognizes that mediators
sometimes have to treat a party differently, when “a party appears to have difficulty comprehending the process, issues, or settlement options, or difficulty
265. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard II.A.
266. See, e.g., Weidner, supra note 5, at 566 (noting, in discussing concerns that remained unresolved by the MODEL STANDARDS, that
most real world mediators when faced with an obvious power imbalance between
the parties want to take some sort of action “to ensure that the power imbalance
does not threaten the ability of the weaker party to assert his own opinions . . .
and to participate fully in the mediation.” However, under the still quite generally-phrased Standard II, that mediator would run the high risk of creating an
appearance of partiality.).
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participating in a mediation.”267 In such case, the Model Standards go on to
provide, “the mediator should explore the circumstances and potential accommodations, modifications or adjustments that would make possible the party’s
capacity to comprehend, participate and exercise self-determination.”268
The Model Standards are not alone in this respect. The Illinois Standards,
for example, provide that “[t]he mediator . . . must attempt to defuse any manipulative or intimidating negotiating techniques utilized by either of the parties”;269 the Family Mediation Canada Code provides that “[t]he mediator has
a duty to ensure balanced negotiations and must not permit manipulative or
intimidating negotiating tactics. While mediators must be impartial towards the
participants, impartiality does not imply neutrality on the issue of procedural
fairness”;270 and the Model Standards of Practice for Family and Divorce Mediation direct mediators in mediations involving domestic abuse to “take appropriate steps to shape the mediation process accordingly.”271 In addition, extensive scholarship discusses the view that mediators need sometimes intervene
to empower weak parties and support balanced negotiation.272
It is submitted, therefore, that the Model Standards should explicitly address the need for mediators to treat parties differently during a mediation, and
guide mediators on the circumstances in which such treatment would be justified.273
C. Conflicts of Interest
1. A Partial Definition of a Conflict of Interest
The Standard of Conflicts of Interest “defines a conflict of interest as a dealing or relationship that undermines a mediator’s impartiality.”274 It provides
that “[a] conflict of interest can arise from involvement by a mediator with the
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.A.10.
Id.
ILLINOIS STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § VI.C.
FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE, supra note 261, at art. 9.4.
FAMILY MEDIATION MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 258, at Standard X; see also ILLINOIS
STANDARDS, supra note 70, at § I.F.; MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard VI.B.
272. See, e.g., James B. Boskey, The Proper Role of the Mediator: Rational Assessment, Not
Pressure, 10 NEGOT. J. 367, 367 (1994); Bush, Ethical Dilemmas, supra note 199, at 25‒26; Michael
Coyle, Defending the Weak and Fighting Unfairness: Can Mediators Respond to the Challenge?, 36
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625, 649 (1998); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for
Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1592 (1991); Shapira, Fairness, supra note 117, at 304–10.
273. In addition, as noted earlier while discussing the misguided use of levels of guidance in the
MODEL STANDARDS in supra Section II.C., the Standard of Impartiality uses the levels of guidance
“shall” and “should” inconsistently, and should be amended as suggested.
274. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 12 (emphasis added).
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subject matter of the dispute or from any relationship between a mediator and
any mediation participant, whether past or present, personal or professional,
that reasonably raises a question of a mediator’s impartiality.”275 The exclusive
focus on impartiality misses an additional important aspect of conflicts of interest: the possible preference of an interest of the mediator over the interests
of all parties. Such cases do not necessarily raise partiality concerns, but rather
questions about the mediator’s commitment to his professional role and to the
parties.
For example, charging fees on an hourly basis constitutes a potential conflict of interest because the mediator has an incentive to drag out the mediation
in order to maximize his remuneration. Of course, we expect mediators to overcome this temptation and act with professional integrity, that is, provide services when these are needed and make decisions on the basis of professional
considerations, but note that the major concern that the mediator might unjustifiably prolong the mediation, thereby preferring his or her personal interest
over the parties’ interest, is one of integrity rather than impartiality.
Another example concerns a (possible) legal duty of the mediator to disclose mediation information to nonparticipants. Unlike the previous example,
which describes a corrupt mediator, here the mediator has a legal justification
to act in a manner that conflicts with the parties’ interest to preserve the confidentiality of the information. The disclosure could undermine the mediator’s
impartiality if the information adversely affects one party, but it could also adversely affect the interests of all parties (if, for example, both parties agreed to
commit a crime), thereby raising a question about the integrity of the process
rather than the impartiality of the mediator.
The point I am making is that a mediator’s conflict of interest may raise a
concern regarding a possible preference of the mediator’s interest over the interests of the parties (in addition to a concern regarding mediator partiality),
and may arise from a duty to act in a particular way (in addition to an involvement with the subject matter of the dispute or from relationship). Mediators
and mediation participants should be aware of such conflicts of interest and the
Standard of Conflicts of Interest should reflect that in the definition of a conflict
of interest.
2. A Need to Externalize the Rationale of a Serious Conflict of Interest
The Model Standards, like other codes of conduct for mediators,276 refer in
effect to two types of conflicts of interest: “minor” conflicts of interest that on
275. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard III.A.
276. See, e.g., FLORIDA RULES, supra note 91, Committee Notes to R. 10.340, at 107.
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disclosure to the parties and reception of their consent do not prevent the mediator from proceeding with the mediation, and “serious” conflicts of interest that
“might reasonably be viewed as undermining the integrity of the mediation,”277
in which case the “mediator shall withdraw from or decline to proceed with the
mediation regardless of the expressed desire or agreement of the parties to the
contrary.”278 This language is unsatisfactory because it leaves doubt as to the
meaning of “the integrity of mediation” and as to the reason why the integrity
of mediation should be preserved, thereby reducing the utility of such guidance
to mediators.
The Reporter’s Notes are more instructive on these points. They explain
that the Model Standards “retains content and language of the 1994 Version
that notes that if the conflict of interest casts serious doubts on process integrity, then the mediator shall decline to proceed despite the preferences of the
parties,”279 and further note that the Joint Committee which drafted the Model
Standards wanted to emphasize that “mediator conduct that raises questions of
conflicts of interest serves to undermine public or party confidence in the central integrity of the process.”280
I think that a better way to describe a process of mediation which lacks
integrity would be to use terms such as a “faulty” or “defective” process, and
that the type of fault or defect that mandates mediator withdrawal should be
described as one that “might undermine public trust in the profession and process of mediation.” I suggest that the rephrased Standard of Conflicts of Interest should provide that where the conflict of interest raises a concern that the
mediator will not be able to avoid harming a party’s interest, and as a result the
mediation might be publicly perceived as faulty, thereby undermining public
trust in the profession and process of mediation, the mediator shall decline to
proceed despite the preference of the parties.
D. Competence
The Standard of Competence suffers from two major defects: it does not
adequately define competence, and it sends a wrong, subjective message on the
level of competence required of mediators, which is inconsistent with the Reporter’s Notes on competence.
The Standard begins by stating that “[a] mediator shall mediate only when
277.
278.
279.
280.

MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard III.E.
Id.
REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 13 (emphasis added).
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
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the mediator has the necessary competence to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the parties,”281 and continues with a declaration that “[a]ny person may
be selected as a mediator, provided that the parties are satisfied with the mediator’s competence and qualifications.”282 This seems to be a peculiar and shaky
criterion for professional competence. Would you, for example, define a lawyer’s, or a doctor’s, or a judge’s competence by reference to his or her clients’,
or his or her patients’, or the disputants’ expectations and satisfaction with his
or her competence and qualifications?
Clearly, different criteria are needed, and the first thing to note is that while
the Model Standards refer again and again to “necessary competence,” they do
not in fact define competence. They do, however, provide two hints regarding
“necessary competence,” by stating that “[t]raining, experience in mediation,
skills, cultural understandings and other qualities are often necessary for mediator competence,”283 and by commenting that “[a] person who offers to serve
as a mediator creates the expectation that the person is competent to mediate
effectively.”284 It is worth noting that these observations focus on the role of
mediators and on the process they conduct. The definitions and existence of
the role of mediators and the process of mediation are professional matters,
largely independent of the parties’ wishes and expectations. The parties’
wishes and expectations can affect and shape a mediator’s role and a mediation
process to some extent, but a certain core of knowledge, skills, and practice will
always remain fixed, as it is with respect to lawyers, doctors, and judges.
I would argue that basic competence in mediation is a state of having the
knowledge and skills necessary for carrying out the role of a mediator in an
effective way, which will ordinarily require training and experience. One will
be able to learn more about this basic competence from the definitions of mediation and of the role of mediators that the Model Standards adopt,285 from the
content of mediation training courses that have become more and more standardized,286 and from the representations a particular mediator makes to the parties. I do not suggest that the Standard of Competence should actually list the
knowledge and skills expected of mediators. However, what should become
clear is that mediators’ competence is necessarily a matter beyond the parties’
281. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at IV.A. (emphasis added).
282. Id. at Standard IV.A.1 (emphasis added).
283. Id. (emphasis added).
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the definition of mediation).
286. See, e.g., MEDIATION TRAINING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES (FLA. SUP. CT.
2013),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/clerk/adminorders/2013/AOSC13-41.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5WB5-R5KZ]; GUIDELINES FOR THE TRAINING AND CERTIFICATION OF COURTREFERRED MEDIATORS (VA. SUP. CT. 2011), http://www.courts.state.va.us/courtadmin/aoc/djs/programs/drs/mediation/training/tom.pdf [https://perma.cc/XN4D-73JB].
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wishes and expectations, and that a Standard of Competence must aim at protecting the institution of mediation and the public, as well as the interests of the
parties.
Unlike the Model Standards, the Reporter’s Notes that accompany them
make this point explicitly, stating that “to promote public confidence in the integrity and usefulness of the process and to protect the members of the public,
an individual representing himself or herself as a mediator must be committed
to serving only in those situations for which he or she possesses the basic competency to assist.”287 This emphasis is lost in the current wording of the Standard of Competence, with its focus on the parties’ expectations and satisfaction,
and it should be reworked to include a definition of competence which is not
satisfied with the parties’ wishes.
E. Confidentiality
Several issues should be addressed in reforming the Standard of Confidentiality.
1. Lack of Guidance on Limitations on Disclosure of Information with
Parties’ Consent
The Standard of Confidentiality correctly conditions disclosure of mediation information by the mediator, which is not sanctioned by law, on the agreement of the parties. It provides that “[i]f the parties to a mediation agree that
the mediator may disclose information obtained during the mediation, the mediator may do so.”288 However, this permissive language might be wrongly
interpreted by mediators as a free license to disclose information with the parties’ consent when in fact this is not the case. The Standard of Confidentiality
should, of course, be read and interpreted in light of all the obligations mediators are subject to, which might, as we have already seen, defeat the parties’
expressed desires.289 A mediator might not be allowed to disclose information
notwithstanding the parties’ wishes if doing so would be inconsistent with the
other standards and undermine the institution of mediation and public trust in
it. For example, if disclosure would lead outsiders to question the impartiality
of the mediator in the conduct of the mediation, the mediator should not disclose the information despite the parties’ agreement because the mediator has a
duty to protect the institution of mediation. Thus, the grounds for permitted
287. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 14 (emphasis added).
288. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.1.
289. See supra Section II.D.
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disclosure290 should be qualified.
2. A Partial Statement on the Discussion of the Extent of Confidentiality
with the Parties
Section V.C of the Standard of Confidentiality provides that “[a] mediator
shall promote understanding among the parties of the extent to which the parties will maintain confidentiality of information they obtain in a mediation.”291
This section, the Reporter’s Notes observe, “targets a mediator’s responsibility
to make certain that the parties understand the extent to which they, not the
mediator, will maintain confidentiality of information that surface[s] in mediation.”292 What is clearly missing is a reference to the mediator’s responsibility
to make certain that the parties understand the extent to which the mediator will
maintain confidentiality.
Parties should know the extent of their mediator’s duty of confidentiality if
they are to be able to exercise self-determination regarding participation in the
mediation and regarding the type of information they can safely share with the
mediator, knowing that it will not be disclosed. The California Rules, for example, provide that “[a]t or before the outset of the first mediation session, a
mediator must provide the participants with a general explanation of the confidentiality of mediation proceedings,”293 and the Family Mediation Canada
Code provides that “[t]he mediator shall inform the participants at the outset of
mediation of the limitations to confidentiality and the fact that confidentiality
cannot be guaranteed.”294
The information provided by the mediator need not be a detailed account of
the law of confidentiality which applies to mediation in his or her jurisdiction.
After all, the mediator is not the parties’ lawyer and need not be a lawyer himor herself. However, the mediator must ensure that the parties have a general
understanding of the extent of confidentiality which applies to him or her and
to the process, in particular the fact that the protection of confidentiality might
not be absolute and that disclosures might be permitted or even required in certain circumstances. The mediator could involve the parties’ representatives (if
they have any) in this process, or recommend that they consult an outside professional on this matter.295
290. See MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at Standard V.A.2, 3.
291. Id. at Standard V.C (emphasis added).
292. REPORTER’S NOTES, supra note 51, at 16 (emphasis added).
293. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 95, at R. 3.854(b).
294. FAMILY MEDIATION CANADA CODE, supra note 261, at art. 7.3; see also id. at art. 11.1(c).
295. An additional modification has been noted previously while discussing the misguided use
of levels of guidance in the MODEL STANDARDS. See discussion supra Section II.C (The Standard of
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IV. CONCLUSION
The introduction of the Model Standards in 1994 and their reform in 2005
have been important steps in the professionalization of mediation, contributing
to the advancement of ethical conduct in the practice of mediation. The standards were designed “to serve as fundamental ethical guidelines” for mediators,
inform mediation parties, and “promote public confidence in mediation as a
process for resolving disputes.”296 The critical analysis of the Model Standards
in this Article has been carried out with the aim of furthering these goals. With
these purposes in mind, the Article has suggested conceptual changes and more
targeted modifications of particular standards that if accepted will radically alter the scope, structure, and content of the Model Standards.
The Article argues that new and reformed Model Standards will supply mediators with a better understanding of their ethical obligations, and with clearer
and more consistent guidance on ethical decision-making and ethical conduct.
Moreover, once reformed, the Model Standards will better inform mediation
participants on what can be expected of mediators in the course of mediation,
and further enhance public confidence in the process and profession of mediation.
The Article is intended to stir up discussion on the need to develop and
adopt new Model Standards, and on their shape and content. I hope it will
stimulate the mediation community to begin a process of reforming the Model
Standards, by having provided insights on conceptual and particular required
amendments.

Confidentiality, it has been observed, uses the levels of guidance “shall” and “should” inconsistently,
and should be amended as suggested.).
296. MODEL STANDARDS, supra note 1, at pmbl.

